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THE PROPHETS AND THE OMRI DYNASTY

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THE Omri dynasty, in Israel, despite its relatively brief career of about half a century,[1] is of unusual significance for the history of Judaism in general and of prophecy in particular. For the prophetic struggle against the House of Omri was motivated by principles that were inherent in prophecy.

Nevertheless the Court policies which provoked the conflict were not in themselves culpable or impolitic. On the contrary, to the modern student they seem wise and statesmanlike. They clashed however with prophetic views which were, in the main, unconcerned with politics. As the struggle between the two parties was prolonged and intensified, the differences became irreconcilable. And in the end, the dynasty was violently overthrown with the active participation of the prophets.

In order to define clearly the unbridgeable chasm that separated the two groups it is necessary to keep in mind the personality of Omri and the policies that he promulgated as well as the nature of pre-literary prophecy as embodied in Elijah and Elisha.

Even the brief description of Omri in the book of Kings reveals him as a strong man of great ability and a statesman. As the founder of his dynasty he initiated the policies which led to the bitter controversy between the Court and the prophets. Since Omri ruled only six years as sole sovereign his influence and accomplishments become all the more remarkable.[2]

Omri was not the usual ever-recurring pest of the Northern Kingdom, a traitorous military adventurer violating the confidence of his king to fulfil unbridled ambition. Unlike the rest

[1] 888 (?)–841 B.C.
[2] I Kings 16: 16–19.

of the usurpers he was not a regicide. Only after Zimri's coup d'état and his triumph over Tibni, another military competitor for the Kingship, was Omri, elevated to the throne by the army under his command. He did not, moreover, execute, as seems to have been the custom, the adherents and relatives of his rival Tibni nor those of the regicide Zimri. And this action undoubtedly is illustrative of his character and may have assisted him in the rapid pacification of the country.

His statesmanship becomes quite clear in the development of his foreign policy. He made peace with the South so that for the first time since the division amity prevailed between the two Kingdoms.[3] He was unquestionably responsible for the marriage of his son Ahab to the Tyrian princess Jezebel which cemented peaceful and profitable relations with commercial Sidon.[4] He successfully placated Damascus.[5] I believe that these various treaties and alliances were segments of a single plan to establish a Greater Palestine in which Israel was to play an important rôle and to have an opportunity for commercial expansion. It may well be that the reason for the completion of these foreign alliances was the renascence of Assyrian power under Ashurnazirpal, a contemporary of Omri and the founder of the new or second Assyrian Empire.[6] As a preventative measure Omri conquered Moab [7] and thus succeeded in establishing peace and common action among the Palestine governments. Judah controlled Edom; he controlled Moab; his alliance with the Phoenicians and Damascus established friendly relations with the Coast and Syria. His successors persevered in

[3] I Kings 22: 45. — Omri certainly must have had a large share in the establishment of peace between the two lands. War between the two Kingdoms ceased with his reign. Hitherto, according to the book of Kings, there was constant warfare. I am inclined to believe that Asa, the contemporary King of Judah, played an important part, if not the decisive rôle, in Omri's attainment of the throne of Israel.

[4] I Kings 16: 31.

[5] I Kings 20: 34.

[6] 884–859 B.C. The Assyrian dates for the period 883–775 are given one year later than usual throughout this study. I follow in this matter Sidney Smith in Cambridge Ancient History III, p. 3, as established by E. Forrer in Mitteilungen der Vorderasiatischen Gesellschaft, 1916. Also Robert Wm. Rogers, History of Babylonia and Assyria, II, pp. 46–71. Also George A. Barton, Archaeology and the Bible (4 ed.), p. 65 and p. 418.

[7] The Mesha Stele or Moabite Stone (George A. Barton, idem, pp. 421–422).

this foreign policy; and this policy, as I shall show, was to a considerable degree the cause of the opposition of Elijah and his prophetic followers.

His internal program testifies further to his statesmanship. He planned the location and construction of a permanent capital. Like David he realized that a disunited people, with strong separatist tendencies and local prejudices, must have a concrete center that would rally and concentrate their political and religious loyalties, and would serve, at the same time, as a national armory and citadel.[8] In every respect Samaria was to become for Israel what Jerusalem was in Judaea.[9]

Such a capital to be effective had to become the religious center of the land. We know that David planned to make Jerusalem the religious metropolis of his domain. And Omri unquestionably planned likewise. It is inconceivable that he should not have had this in view for Samaria. In antiquity the seat of political power and the principal sanctuary, symbolic of the official religion, were never separated. I believe, therefore, that Omri planned for Samaria, at least, to rival Shechem, Beth El and Dan, where the important Northern sanctuaries were located.[10] These towns were unfavorably situated for Omri's purposes,[11] and hence the need for a centrally located shrine in the heart of the country. And Samaria was the logical place. Omri's death interrupted the execution of this project. For some reason, difficult to understand, Ahab did not build a YHWH fane in Samaria. And Jezebel seized the opportunity, as shall presently appear, to make the capital the center of her cult. It was this conversion of the capital to pagan worship

[8] Its (Samaria's) position "before the invention of gunpowder must have been almost impregnable" — George Adam Smith, The Historical Geography of the Holy Land, p. 344.

[9] Ernest Renan, History of the People of Israel, 2nd division, p. 208 — Omri "was a real creator, a kind of David, to whom only religious prestige was wanting. . . . His dynasty left an imperishable mark. . . ." This lack of "religious prestige," I hold, was due to his short reign and to Ahab's failure to make Samaria a center of YHWH worship.

[10] I Kings 12: 29.

[11] They were not strategically located for defense nor for the new commercial expansion, contemplated by the royal policies which shifted the center of influence towards the coast. George Adam Smith, op. cit., p. 344.

that fired and kept aglow at white heat the enmity of the prophetic party against the dynasty.

Samaria immediately attained the status of an important emporium. The business activity, due to the public works program, brought many people and much capital to the city. As the permanent royal residence it attracted the courtiers and the wealthy; and it thus became a lucrative market for luxuries and fineries.[12] In this commercial boom the Phoenician allies willingly helped. Aram offered peace on condition that her merchants be granted special concessions in Samaria's markets. Omri accepted this proffer in order to pursue his policy unhindered by war.[13]

This brief sketch suffices to indicate Omri's achievements. His reputation was such that the Assyrian chronicler, recording the tribute of Jehu, the usurper who overthrew the dynasty, calls the kingdom "Mat Humri," "the land of Omri." [14] To my mind the historians miss the point of this remark with their explanation that the Assyrian scribe was unaware of the overthrow of the Omri family. This can easily be granted. The far more significant fact is that the Assyrians should know of Omri at all. The Easterners do not appear to have had direct contact with Israel during Omri's reign. Shalmeneser III (859–824) who essayed to conquer the West and whose recorder made the significant statement, certainly did not know him. As a matter of fact, as late as in the inscriptions of Tiglath Pileser IV (745–727) the Northern realm is still called the land of Omri.[15] Evidently Omri, despite his short reign, had so impressed his personality upon his time and his country that foreign statesmen linked his name with the Kingdom to the end of its existence.[16]

Pre-literary prophecy is not sufficiently recognized as a dynamic factor in the civilization of Israel. As a matter of fact

[12] The ivory objects recently found in the ruins of the Omri-Ahab palace show that the luxuries and fashions of the Court did not differ from those of Syria and Assyria — Palestine Exploration Fund, Quarterly Statement, 1933, p. 9.

[13] I Kings 20: 34.

[14] Obelisk inscription Robert Wm. Rogers, Cuneiform Parallels to the Old Testament, p. 34.

[15] Idem, pp. 319–320.

[16] Robert Wm. Rogers, History of Babylonia and Assyria, p. 96 note 1. "The Land of Omri is the usual expression for the land of Israel, during a long period. Omri made so deep an impression upon his neighbors that his country was named after him."

the prophetic guild, from its inception in the Samuel era, creatively initiated and actively participated in the significant movements of the life of the people: prophecy was instrumental in the rise and fall of Saul, in the enthronement of David, in the development of Davidic policies, and in the Division of the Kingdom; and it functioned subsequently in both countries.[17] Its will to action was prompted by a double purpose: (1) to hold the people steadfast to YHWH, their sole Guardian and Law Giver; and (2) to create a spiritually self-sufficient, unified people whose life and institutions should be based on justice and austere simplicity. In a sense the two are but one principle, inspired by the Mosaic tradition. With this tradition as an accepted guide, the prophets believed that Israel would be a peculiar people and that it would reject all incompatible phases of Palestinian or Semitic civilization.

I believe that these purposes largely explain the behavior of the pre-literary prophets throughout and also the reason for their opposition to the policies of the Kings, with the exception of David, Asa, and to a lesser degree, those of Jehoshophat. In other words, the prophets functioned during this era primarily as an opposition party that refused to make concessions to reality or to the demands of politics. They thus prepared the soil for the burgeoning of prophecy in its great literary protagonists.

During the initial period of the Omri dynasty the prophets faced an inner controversy that ended in a schism. Some apparently approved of the Omri policies and favored coöperation with the Court; others saw in them danger to their concepts of God and Israel and advocated the usual prophetic position of criticism and non-coöperation. During Ahab's reign, this inner conflict resulted in a definite cleavage, with Elijah as the spearhead of the opposition party, and Zedekiah as the chief of the court faction.[18]

[17] The narrative in the books of Samuel and Kings substantiates these statements. For a detailed discussion of these activities see my essay, A Chapter of Israelitish History, Bibliotheca Sacra, 1928, pp. 188–223.

[18] The cleavage among the prophets of this age is fully comparable to the two groupings characteristic of the literary prophetic era prior to the destruction of Jerusalem. The "false" prophets were court partisans; the "true" prophets were the opponents of palace policies.

Elijah was, therefore, not an isolated personality, an individual phenomenon, who suddenly appeared on the scene as the fiery enemy of the Court. He was part of the pre-literary prophetic movement whose roots were imbedded in the Mosaic tradition. His unique rôle in Israel's history lies in his "bolting," to use a modern political term, the regular prophetic organization and in his uncompromising insistence on ideals which were the traditional prophetic principles. He and his group were zealots, "jealous for the Lord." [19]

It is necessary at this point to investigate in considerable detail the religious views of Elijah and Elisha. For incidents are enumerated in their biographies which clearly mark them as the immediate forerunners, if not the confrères, of the literary prophets, Amos and Hosea, and even of the Palestinian Isaiah.

As stated, Elijah was a zealot, "jealous for YHWH." Just as YHWH is conceived in the Mosaic tradition as a "jealous God," [20] brooking no rival and acknowledging no equal, so Elijah, as His mouthpiece, is vigilant against any attempt to set up deities that might share in the Godhood of YHWH. There can be no question that Elijah was correct in assuming that the Tyrian Baal was being introduced as a rival of YHWH. He resented these encroachments and fought them bitterly and without compromise.

His stern opposition to Baal worship was not simply due to the fact that the Baal was a foreign deity, the god of Tyre. It was rather due to the conviction that the Baal was no god at all. Elijah clearly but derisively shows his opinion at the Carmel test, as he mocks: "for he (Baal) is a god, either he is musing, or he is gone aside, or he is on a journey, or peradventure he sleepeth and must be awakened." [21] YHWH is God, Baal is nothing, is Elijah's view.

This exalted conception of YHWH, closely approximating, if not actually achieving, universality, is further emphasized in

[19] I Kings 19: 10.

[20] Ex. 20: 4; 21: 23; 22: 19. Irrespective of the date when we place these statements, the underlying idea is unquestionably Mosaic.

[21] I Kings 18: 27.

the use of the phrase "YHWH Zebaoth" (the Lord of Hosts).[22] Here YHWH cannot be a Mars. There is no point to such a conception. YHWH is pictured as God of the cosmic hosts or forces just as in Amos and the later prophets.

The cosmic character of YHWH is again stressed when it is stated that He sends rain, and that He prevents rain and causes drought. In such a country as Palestine rain was (and still is) an absolute prerequisite; and rain-giving was considered of divine power. To Elijah YHWH was the sole rain-giver. Against His will, no natural force could act; and by the same token every natural phenomenon acted in obedience to His will. YHWH thus became the sole ruler of nature.[23]

Moreover, in the theophany on Mt. Horeb, the picture of YHWH is divested of crude nature-personifications and is presented as altogether spiritual. YHWH is no longer discerned in the fire, in the storm, or in the earthquake, but in "a small still voice," which expresses "through the least sensuous of material objects the spirituality of YHWH." [24]

The authority and power of YHWH reach beyond the boundaries of Israel. Elijah orders Elisha to anoint Hazael as King of Aram. YHWH wills to use the Aramaean Kingdom as an instrument wherewith to punish Israel.[25] YHWH is here the God of history who utilizes peoples for His own purposes.

Again, Elijah, during the drought, is advised to live with a widow in Zarephath, "which belongeth to Zidon." [26] There he is under the protection and guidance of YHWH whose authority is definite even in non-Israelitish territory. Surely this cumulative evidence suffices to designate Elijah as a monotheist, a real herald of the subsequent literary prophets.

Elijah conceived YHWH as a just God, a merciful God. The Naboth Vineyard incident fully establishes this attribute in YHWH. Elijah refused to tolerate injustice even when perpetrated by the mighty. He boldly announced the retribution that would ensue; and Divine justice was vindicated. But the

[22] I Kings 19: 10.

[23] I Kings 17: 1; 18: 41–45; 17: 14; 18: 1.

[24] John Skinner, The New Century Bible, Kings, p. 239. Note on "The Theophany on Horeb."

[25] I Kings 19: 15–17.

[26] I Kings 17: 9.

justice of YHWH is not grim and rigorous. When Ahab repented the awful deed, God had compassion upon him and postponed the penalty. Thus this story describes the courage of the prophet of YHWH; and it pictures YHWH as the Champion of the oppressed and the penitent, traits which recur in prophetic literature.[27]

The attitude of Elijah towards Israel is exemplified in the harsh complaint: "the children of Israel have forsaken Thy covenant, thrown down Thy altars, and slain Thy prophets with the sword; and I, even I, alone am left; and they seek my life to take it away." [28] The inference is plain: Elijah seeks dire punishment for the people because they, in his opinion, have completely forsaken the religion of YHWH. They consequently deserve to be punished. Is not this the viewpoint of later prophets?

Moreover there is even a definite reference to the idea of the Remnant which plays such a peculiar part in the thought of the writing prophets. In response to Elijah's demands for the punishment of back-sliding Israel, YHWH designates the instrumentalities of destruction; but "seven thousand in Israel, all the knees which have not bowed to Baal, and every mouth which hath not kissed him," [29] the true, the steadfast, the Remnant, will not perish.

Elijah is pictured in the Bible as a stern, uncompromising zealot who will not yield an inch in his unceasing efforts to remove the influences of the Tyrian Baal. He appraised the two religions justly and correctly decided that they could not exist side by side: the sensuous nature religion of Canaan, on the one side, and, on the other, the ethical religion of YHWH as envisaged by the bearers of the Mosaic tradition. Having made that decision, with unflinching courage and absolute devotion, he hurled himself grimly into the fray. Though often defeated and sometimes discouraged, his labors for the overthrow of Baalism were unflagging. And when his time came to leave this earth, he handed on the torch of his conviction to Elisha who

[27] I Kings 21. [28] I Kings 19: 14.

[29] I Kings 19: 18. Idem — Note on V. 18. "It is an anticipation of the later prophetic doctrine of the Remnant, the pious kernel, the Israel within Israel, to whom belongs the promise of the future."

kept its flame aglow until victorious. In the end his principles won. Another crisis in Israel's life had become history; another full step in the rearing of the prophetic conception of God and religion had been taken.

Elijah, in my opinion, must be ranked along with Moses and Samuel, as the great religious teachers in the pre-prophetic career of Israel.[30]

Elisha was quite a different figure. Despite the tradition that he was endowed with a double share of the Divine spirit, he was not comparable, in any way, to Elijah. He was not as solitary a figure as his master. He lived among the prophets who recognized him as their chief. He adhered, however, to Elijah's policies towards the Omri dynasty and manipulated the overthrow of the ruling family.

With the rise of Jehu and his successors Elisha became an influential ally and an esteemed counsellor of the Court. He did his utmost to organize resistance against the Aramaean incursions; [31] and this seems to have been his primary concern and task. It is difficult to visualize his religious ideas. There was no occasion for him to clarify them. Owing to the abolition of Baalism the tension between the prophets and the rulers had ceased. Religious controversy had stopped.

The prophets, the followers of Elisha, resumed their official status as Court clients. Therein lay the inherent weakness of prophecy. Only in crises, when primary religious ideas were endangered, did the prophets abandon this status and stand forth as fervent defenders of the values and the ideals which are fundamentally prophetic. During periods of normalcy, when their life-views were not seriously challenged, they were content to live under royal patronage and tended to become spiritually stagnant.

[30] Idem, p. 222. Skinner thus appraises Elijah: "As the precursor of the prophetic movement of the following century, he is to be ranked as the greatest religious personality that has been raised up in Israel since Moses." Wellhausen's view as cited by Skinner: "For him (Elijah) there existed no plurality of Divine Powers, operating with equal authority in different spheres, but everywhere One Holy and Mighty Being who revealed Himself, not in the life of nature but in those laws by which alone human society is held together in the ethical demands of the spirit."

[31] II Kings 6: 21; 6: 31–33 as interpreted by Skinner, op. cit., p. 308, Note on vs. 31–33. Also II Kings 13: 14–20.

Elisha was a loyal Jehuite, respected and revered in the land for the achievements of his early career as the militant exponent of Elijah's cause and for his aid in the wars against Aram. Those were his fruitful days; that was his fruitful labor. After the revolution he lived the life of a sheltered personality, kindly, tolerant, and not at all antagonistic to the social and religious status quo.[32] He was in fact a counsellor to the ruling régime.

The question therefore presents itself: why were Elijah and his adherents so relentlessly inimical towards the Omri dynasty?

To give the usual answer, namely, that Elijah and Elisha and their group fought Ahab and his successors because the Royal House ignored the worship of YHWH and persecuted its devotees, and had become the protagonists of Baal cults, flies in the face of facts as found in the book of Kings and in archaeological material. It is in place therefore to present the data which contravene this assumption.

(1) We know that Ahab named his children, including Athaliah, the future Queen of Judaea, with compounds of YH, the name of Israel's national Deity.[33] In Oriental antiquity people, in this way, designated their religious allegiance. Ahab, accordingly, must have been loyal to the national religion and to Israel's God.

Furthermore, historians believe that this usage of the Divine Name really began in Ahab's reign.[34] Not a single king of Israel had hitherto borne such a theophoric name. Even in Judaea, Abijah, Rehoboam's son and heir (if this is the correct reading) is the only exception.[35] Otherwise the first Southern monarch with this name-style is Jehoshophat, Ahab's contemporary, the son of Asa, a religious reformer of considerable significance.[36] The rise of this fashion in proper names in the Northern court disproves their disloyalty to the national

[32] Skinner, op. cit., p. 350 (Note on Death and Burial of Elisha).

[33] The three whom the book of Kings mentions have YH-compounded names: Ahazyahu, Jehoram and Athaliah.

[34] A. T. Olmstead, History of Palestine and Syria, p. 380. Also G. B. Gray, Studies in Hebrew Proper Names, pp. 149–163; 243–270.

[35] The book of Kings calls him Abijam I Kings 15: 1–9; Chronicles has Abijah II Chron. 13.

[36] I Kings 15: 12–15. I believe that the influence of Asa upon the Omri family in political and religious policies was directive and determinative.

YHWH religion. Again, the ostraca, found by the Harvard Expedition in the Omri-Ahab palace in Samaria, reveal that YH-compounded names were quite current among the populace.[37] These ostraca-labels were attached to wine and oil jugs, brought into the royal treasury as taxes on produce, and designated the payer and the payee and often the source of the payment. Of interest to us is that the names are equally divided between YH-compounded and neutral names,[38] while only four are combined with Baal.[39]

Professor A. T. Olmstead in his recent book, The History of Assyria, writes: "The predominance of Baal names (among the ostraca) is no accident; the men of the court were deliberately giving them to their sons." [40] My examination of the names contradicts this view. Courtiers throughout history are essentially alike. With the royal family in favor of YH names they would certainly follow the royal fashion and assuredly not deviate from it.[41]

(2) At the famous Mt. Carmel test Elijah, in Ahab's presence, slays the "Baal prophets." [42] Is it reasonable to assume that as a Baal partisan Ahab would have permitted such an act? I suspect that he cleverly and even maliciously used Elijah to be rid of them. They probably were led by Tyrian priests and the temple attachés whom Jezebel had brought to Samaria to serve before the Baal shrines and to propagate their cult.[43]

[37] Reisner, Fisher and Lyon, Harvard Excavations in Palestine, Part I, pp. 230–247.

[38] Neutral names are those which have neither YH nor Baal as a component. I find 21 YH and 20 neutral names among the "recipients" of the tax.

[39] Among the "recipients" I find only one definite Baal compounded name, Baal-zamar, who may well have been a Phoenician. Hanan Ba'ara is found on three ostraca. Assuming that this is an abbreviated form of a Baal compounded name, there is a total of four Baal names.

[40] See also his History of Syria and Palestine, p. 381 — "The ostraca show as many men who honored Baal as Yahweh."

[41] The relatively smaller number of names of tax payers contain a larger proportion of Baal names. This tends to prove, in my opinion, that Baal names were becoming less popular among the official classes than among the common folk. This conclusion is directly opposed to that of Professor Olmstead.

[42] I Kings 18: 19–41.

[43] It is not necessary to accept the complete historicity of this event to assume that Ahab permitted a rebuff to the Baal priesthood. It is well to apply here the canon of historical criticism enunciated by Professor Joseph Klausner in his Jesus of Nazareth, "From nothing comes forth only nothing."

(3) Even the book of Kings with all its animosity towards Ahab presents a rather sympathetic picture of him. When Elijah pronounces doom upon him and his family for the Naboth Vineyard affair, Ahab's reaction compares quite favorably with that of David to Nathan's reproof. Ahab is revealed as a truly religious personality. His prayer and repentance are accepted by YHWH, who mitigates the dire decrees. Ahab in this instance is certainly a YHWH loyalist, and not a Baal worshipper.[44]

(4) The ill-fated Jehoram, King of Israel, whom Jehu, by the advice and connivance of Elisha, treacherously slew as the first step in the revolt, is described in the book of Kings as a religious reformer of the type of the Judaean Asa, and as a devout adherent of the national YHWH religion.[45] Yet Jehoram was assassinated at the instigation of Elisha and his supporters.[46]

(5) Obadiah was an important court official quite close to the person of the king. He was an avowed YHWH worshipper. Ahab seems to have known him as such.[47] Yet he retained Obadiah in his service and in his confidence.

(6) Both Elijah and Elisha had adherents who publicly proclaimed their religious allegiance. They seem to have remained entirely unmolested, particularly during Elisha's early leadership.[48] This seems to disprove the general opinion implied also in the book of Kings that YHWH loyalists were persecuted by Ahab and his sons.

(7) The Zedekiah-Micaiah episode is also instructive. The former was the head of the court prophetic faction. As his name indicates, he could not have been a Baal worshipper, though the text implies that he was.[49] He and his fellows were sum-

[44] Compare I Kings 21: 27–29 with II Samuel 11.

[45] Compare II Kings 3: 2–4 with I Kings 15: 11–14. [46] II Kings 9: 22–26.

[47] I Kings 18: 3–6.

[48] The Elisha folk tales show him traversing the country freely with his companions. It must however be admitted that this may have occurred after the overthrow of the Omri dynasty. Elijah seems to be constantly in touch with his adherents, though he frequently had to flee the country for safety.

[49] Harold M. Wiener in his essay, The Religion of Moses, Bibliotheca Sacra, 1919, argues that these verses originally showed that the Zedekiah prophetic group were Baal adherents but later editors corrected the text to read as at present. I cannot accept this theory because the editors had no reason to desire to place this group in a favorable light.

moned, at the request of Jehoshophat of Judaea, to give their counsel, in the name of YHWH, as to the result of the contemplated attack on Ramoth Gilead. They clearly prophesy in the name of YHWH.

The Judaite King, knowing of the schism among the prophets, begs for a representative of the opposite group.[50] And Micaiah, a prophetic enemy of the Royal House, is brought, without any apparent difficulty, before the rulers. He also gives his advice in the name of YHWH, — the usual opposition to war and foreign entanglements.

It is only after this unfavorable prophecy that the enraged unnamed King of Israel ordered him to be jailed. But hitherto Micaiah had been at liberty. He was not in hiding; for the officials knew his residence and knew his record of opposition to the royal policies. The text implies all this. Micaiah, therefore, cannot be said to have been persecuted. He lived in safety and his opinions were known.[51]

Against this series of facts, I find reported only two instances of positive disloyalty to YHWH by a scion of the House of Omri. The first narrates that the crippled Ahazjahu, Ahab's successor to the throne, sent messengers to the shrines of Ekron to beseech Baal-Zebub for relief from his illness.[52] The second deals with Athaliah, the Queen of Judah: after her assassination, "the people of the land went to the house of Baal and broke it down, his altars and his images broke they in pieces thoroughly, and slew Mattan the priest of Baal before the altars." But the "House of the Lord" had remained intact in the service of the Lord.[53]

This catalogue of facts should show that Ahab and his successors were not fanatical Baal protagonists who attempted to uproot the YHWH worship in Israel. If this much is conceded,

[50] Micaiah's prophecy indicates that he did not regard Zedekiah and his followers as Baalists but rather as "lying prophets." The literary prophets thus regarded their opponents. Skinner, op. cit., p. 263. Note on the Prophets of Evil.

[51] I Kings 22: 2–29.

[52] II Kings 1: 2–3.

[53] II Kings 11: 4–18. The text clearly states that the Baal shrine was distinct and separate from the Temple, the official sanctuary. This Mattan may well have been a Tyrian priest, perhaps a member of the Phoenician Royal House — actually related to Athaliah.

as I think the data warrant, the original question stands: What provoked the struggle that culminated in the revolt of the prophets against the House of Omri? And the answer, as is usual in historical problems, must be sought in a plurality of causes. A single factor may be a simple solution for an historical difficulty, but, as a rule, it is not the correct solution. And I believe that a proper study of the present problem will bring to the fore a plurality of factors, intertwined and interdependent, that were responsible for the Elisha-Jehu uprising.

The first factor that initiated and continually intensified the breach between court and prophecy was the incompatibility of the personalities of Jezebel and Elijah. The two were irreconcilable. Between them Ahab was helpless like grist between the upper and nether stones of a mill. He was not sufficiently strong to command them, nor dexterous enough to steer skillfully between them. He was beguiled by the Queen, and victimized by the dominant, obstinate wills of both.

Jezebel was the daughter of the Tyrian priest-king Itobaal who gained the throne of his country through regicide. She was obsessed with the proselytizing zeal of a priest and the obdurate scheming of a political intriguer — traits foreshadowed in her father's career. She was courageous and dominating. She was impatient with opponents, a characteristic of parvenu and impulsive rulers. She brought to Samaria the pomp and the luxury of the Phoenician court as well as the rich and sensuous pageantry of the Phoenician cults, and held in contempt the relatively rustic and austere civilization of Israel. She was evidently determined from the beginning to "civilize" the country in accordance with her views. A woman of this type was bound to wield singular influence behind the scenes and also officially. And she used her position and her influence to transform the land to her views.[54] She consequently clashed with Elijah who, as has been pointed out, was just as determined in his loyalty to YHWH. She tried unsuccessfully to brush him aside. She outlived Ahab and her two reigning sons.

[54] This was especially true of Samaria the capital city. The "culture of Samaria was different from other Israelitish towns" — Palestine Exploration Fund, Quarterly Statement, 1933, p. 23.

Her long life, devoted throughout to the service of her cult, was a constant irritant and provocation to the Elijah prophets and kept afire their hatred of her family. In the end she was brutally killed by the rebel Jehu. I shall show in the sequence that the book of Kings puts the responsibility for the catastrophe upon her shoulders.

When Jezebel came to Samaria, Ahab built a temple for her native religion. This was not, judged by the then accepted standards of religion, disloyalty to YHWH as the national deity of Israel. Just as Solomon had formerly done in Jerusalem for the princesses of his harem, so Ahab built a temple for his queen.[55] This was evidently the accepted practice in international alliances. The establishment of the Tyrian sanctuary naturally required the importation of Tyrian priests and their retinues to officiate. To this arrangement one section of the prophets with Elijah at their head was strenuously opposed. For this group refused to tolerate shrines to any other deity than YHWH in the land, just as in Solomon's era the prophetic guild opposed the establishment of foreign shrines in Jerusalem. This opposition significantly enough was a contributing factor in the Division of the Kingdom after Solomon's death.[56] Hence we can understand the importance of the prophetic opposition on this score, especially since Samaria was altogether without a YHWH temple.

In initiating and supporting extensive "propaganda" for her cult, Jezebel further offended the prophetic group. Quite naturally the more influential the foreign cult became, the more aggressive, the more fiery, the more fervent, became the prophetic opposition. And the Jezebel faction at court unquestionably reciprocated in kind. Consequently Ahab's task was to act as conciliator, a rôle in which he signally failed. And he was manoeuvered into granting permission for the persecution of the prophetic guild — an act which the book of Kings implies but does not specifically elucidate, though it does clearly blame Jezebel on various occasions for the civil strife.[57]

[55] Compare I Kings 16: 32–33 with I Kings 11: 1–8.

[56] See my essay, A Chapter of Israelitish History, Bibliotheca Sacra, 1928, p. 221.

[57] I Kings 18: 4; 19: 2; 21: 26.

I must repeat here my opinion that Omri had planned the religious center, or at least a religious center, of his domain in Samaria. He died before this plan was completed. Ahab neglected to execute this project. Perhaps it was because the priestly families and the citizens of Beth El and Dan and the local Bomot opposed this action for fear of weakening their power and position, their influence and affluence. Ahab perhaps surrendered to this opposition because he knew what rôle the priestly families had played in the Division of the Kingdom after Solomon's death.[58] Be that as it may, no sanctuary to YHWH was reared in the capital. And Jezebel seized the opportunity to make Samaria the focal point of the Phoenician cult. The book of Kings makes this quite apparent. It was a continual subject of dispute. The zealous YHWH prophets found the Dynasty that permitted the capital to become the rallying place for what they believed to be a rival religion, a foreign cult, that corrupted the civilization of Israel and undermined loyalty to YHWH,[59] a constant irritation.

Moreover, as the friendship between North and South ripened and culminated in the marriage of Athaliah, the princess of Israel, to Jehoram, the heir to the throne of Judah,[60] the prophets became singularly alarmed. They were afraid that the Baal propaganda would become widespread and would affect the religion of YHWH in Judah too.

It must be borne in mind that Judah by its very geography

[58] My essay — pp. 220–221. It should be added that when King Josiah, after 621 B.C., destroyed the Bomot and the local shrines he did not abolish the local priesthoods. He brought them to Jerusalem and provided for them out of the Temple treasury. II Kings 23: 8–10. See Skinner's comment on these verses, op. cit., pp. 419–420. Compare with Deut. 18: 6–8. See also Max L. Margolis, The Hebrew Scriptures in the Making, pp. 106–107.

[59] The recent finds at Samaria of ivory statuettes with a religious motif, depicting Egyptian deities and other religious symbols, undoubtedly imported through Phoenician trade channels, show the tolerance of the Ahab régime which the zealots could not endure. Even if these objects were used only for decorative purposes, which is not likely, they must have angered the prophets who were nurtured on the Mosaic tradition of antipathy to idolatry. See Palestine Exploration Fund, Quarterly Statement, 1933, pp. 20–22.

[60] II Kings 8: 18, 8: 27, II Chron. 18: 1.

was limited to a simple civilization — sheep raising ever maintained itself as an important industry.[61] Judaea therefore was fruitful soil for the retention of the desert tradition and the teachings of Moses, the inspiration for prophetic activity. And, in fact, the South did maintain in a much larger measure than the North the pure concept of YHWH and the austere and simple elements of the Mosaic tradition.[62]

The prophets consequently had ample cause to fear the weakening of the national religion and civilization of Judaea by means of foreign influences. These were of little consequence as long as Jehoshophat reigned. With his death, however, Northern influence increased in the South. The two Kingdoms were governed by the same family, the same personages and the same policies. Jezebel lived throughout this period, and her prestige, as the dowager Queen, must have been extensive, in both lands. To the prophets this was calamitous. They believed that the entire national fabric even in Judaea was endangered by the sinister penetration of sensuous Baalism. Their entire program was in danger. So it was that the bitter opposition turned to planned rebellion.

What was the attitude of Ahab and his successors to the rise and growth of Baal influence? The Kings were, on the whole, steadfast in their loyalty to YHWH as currently understood and accepted. Ahab and Jehoram certainly regarded themselves as faithful adherents of YHWH. Their attitudes were shaped by politics. They saw no disrespect to their national religion in the tolerance of other cults in the land. They perceived no danger to the national commonweal in this toleration. In this regard they were "orthodox," the status quo upholders — their conception of YHWH as the God of Israel did not preclude other deities. The prophets were the jealous zealots,

[61] Despite Gen. 49: 11–12, which idealizes Judah as a rich wine and dairy country, Judah was "physically most barren and awkward"; its "prevailing aspect pastoral." George Adam Smith, op. cit., pp. 257, 310. For full details see his chapter on "The Character of Judah," pp. 305–320. Compare Jer. 33: 12–13.

[62] It is not necessary for my purpose to accept the thesis, which many since Renan support, that the prophets were altogether opposed to the growth of commerce and industry. They were opposed to the rapid industrialization of the country because of its effects upon the religious and social life of the nation.

the innovators, who refused to brook any rivals whatever to YHWH.[63]

From this standpoint the struggle between the two parties was inevitable. The dynasts, interested in pursuing political policies, as a matter of course were bound to clash with the Elijah prophets who looked upon life through altogether different eyes. And each regarded the other as the "trouble makers." [64] No community of interest mitigated the sharpness of this antagonism. When Jehoram introduced his reforms which in effect destroyed the influence and prestige of the Baal cult, the die had been cast.[65] It was too late for a rapprochement, probably because the plans for the revolt had already begun to crystallize.

One phase of the alien cultus which particularly incensed the prophets must be recorded as an additional disruptive factor. Its ritual was rich in sensuality and steeped in sexual suggestiveness. Undoubtedly many local shrines, nominally dedicated to YHWH, had adopted orgiastic practices. But despite the syncretistic forces operative in the life of Israel since their settlement in Palestine, the religion of Israel was still largely based, in its simplicity and austerity, on the Mosaic tradition. And the YHWH sanctuaries, surely the most prominent institutions, reflected this tradition. And the prophets who were its guardians were determined to keep it alive and strong. They even attacked as unjustifiable the degree of sumptuousness and licentiousness that had been introduced into the YHWH shrines. Hence we can understand the prophetic attitude towards this type of ritual, especially as it attracted the wealthy families of Samaria. This is one reason, I believe, that prompted the Rechabites to support the prophetically engineered coup of Jehu against the dynasty.[66]

[63] As has already been argued, Elijah without doubt was a monotheist; to what extent his followers, especially in the Elisha era, were likewise is difficult to establish.

[64] I Kings 18: 17–18.

[65] The prophets probably distrusted the sincerity of Jehoram. As long as Jezebel lived her influence was definitive and a thorn in the side of the prophets.

[66] Jer. 35 amply shows the principles of the Rechabites. They were extreme adherents of desert civilization and believed it to be in consonance with the Mosaic tradition. This does not prove, however, that the Elijah prophetic following and the later

The foreign policy of the dynasty was a powerful factor in the estrangement of the two factions. This policy, as stated, built on alliances with neighboring peoples, aimed at establishing a Greater Palestine, in which Israel should play a prominent part. Why should the prophets oppose this foreign policy? For two reasons: in the first place, Judah, by this policy, as already remarked, became intimately attached and subservient to the North. This was particularly true after Jehoshophat's death. The book of Kings stigmatizes Jehoram and Ahazyahu, Kings of Judaea, as following the policies of the "House of Ahab." [67]

The prophets objected to this de facto union because, as stated, the danger to the indigenous culture of Israel was doubled. Judah was opened to the influences of the North; Judah was invaded by Baal shrines and Baal propaganda. Hence the status of the national religion was weakened, and the zeal of the prophets strengthened. So much so that I regard this political bond between the two lands as a primary cause for the decision to revolt.

At this point it is essential to reiterate that the dynasts, considering their aims from an immediate and political standpoint, foresaw no danger. They believed that the unity gave added strength and assurance of preservation to the larger Israel. They perhaps dreamed of a restoration of the union. Nor did they disbelieve in the tradition and religion of Israel as commonly understood. They refused to accept the Elijah-Elisha interpretation of that tradition and religion which seemed to run counter to their policies and purposes. Here again compromise was beyond discussion. Hence the determination to overthrow the ruling house.

In the second place, the policy of alliances with Canaanite peoples by its very nature challenged the prophetic conception

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literary prophets agreed with them. Both prophetic groups were opposed to the luxuries and the greed of the higher social classes. The ivory finds, already alluded to, show, to some extent, the range of these luxuries in the Ahab age. That is why I regard the garb which Elijah, and probably his followers too, wore (II Kings 1: 8) as a symbolic protest against the prevailing fashions of the upper classes.

[67] II Kings 8: 18; 10: 13.

of YHWH. We definitely know that the literary prophets, a century later, as well as the editors of the books of Kings and Chronicles, disapproved of international alliances on religious grounds. They held that such treaties denied the authority of YHWH as sole Sovereign and Protector of Israel, since they implied reliance on foreign states for security, and, therefore, in accordance with current religious concepts, on the gods of these states. For this reason the prophets consistently favored neutrality and opposed alliances even for defensive purposes.[68] We may rightfully surmise that the Elijah adherents were of the same opinion.

Familiarity with the archaeological records of the ancient East makes plain the reason for this prophetic attitude. The inscriptions show that the Kings, hence the peoples and the armies, were instruments of their national deities. They fought, conquered and were vanquished in the name of their gods. The Moabite stone, a contemporaneous document, illustrates and confirms this viewpoint — Mesha revolted, fought, devastated, and won under the tutelage of his god Chemosh.[69] The contemporary Assyrian records corroborate this thesis. Shalmaneser III, the Assyrian emperor, campaigned, conquered, and plundered in the name of his patron gods. He and his gods were one.[70] With this in mind we can appreciate why the zealous prophets objected to alliances. Such action implied the recognition of the power of the deities of the allies to assist in the protection of Israel. It compromised with the prophetic view of the position of YHWH as the sole defender of Israel. And prophets were not compromisers. YHWH alone, they insisted,

[68] II Chr. 16: 7; 20: 35-37. I Kings 20: 39–43. The legal dictum in Ex. 23: 32— "Thou shalt make no covenant with them (the Canaanites) nor with their gods," was sufficient basis for objecting to treaties with states in Palestine. Alliance with a state was synonymous to alliance with its gods. — Alfred Bertholet, History of Hebrew Civilization (translated by Rev. A. K. Dallis), note 4, p. 370. Also Is. 10: 4; 17: 10; 28: 15, 18.

[69] See note 7.

[70] See the archaeological records of Egypt and Assyria. The records of Shalmaneser III, the contemporary of Ahab, is a good example. Rogers, Cuneiform Parallels to the Old Testament, pp. 288–304. Tribute paid to the conqueror is called "dues of Asshur my Lord." Also Rogers, History of Babylonia and Assyria, II, p. 56. This fact is so well known that it need not be argued further.

will sustain and defend Israel, if Israel merits Divine support. Defeat implies His displeasure with Israel. Military alliances contravened this theological conception and seemed to deny the omnipotence of YHWH. Hence we have here a vital factor in the struggle of the two groups.

As a further consequence of this theological doctrine, the prophets frowned upon all intimate relations between the sovereigns of Israel and those of other countries. Usually gifts would be exchanged. And these were inscribed and sent in the name of the national deities. Archaeology is here again a great help. We know that Osorkon II of Egypt presented Ahab with a two-handled jar of Egyptian alabaster, containing without doubt some precious unguent. The inscription on this vase reads: "[King of Upper and Lower Egypt] Re-Wesmaat chosen of Amon, [Lord of the two Lands, Beloved of Amon, son of Bast Osork] on, hin 81." [71]

From the prophetic viewpoint, the recipient of this inscribed jar recognized the divinity of Amon, because the gift, by implication, was sent by Amon, as the suzerain of Osorkon. And this defines the prophetic position towards such exchanges.[72]

Here we are again confronted with the inevitability of the conflict between the two points of view: the political and the religious. The Court and the politicians looked upon their problems from the viewpoint of immediate political necessity; the prophets from the standpoint of YHWH — centrism, that is, YHWH and His will must be sovereign in Israel's affairs. And the bitterness that ensued is explicable. There was no meeting ground of common purpose or mutual sympathy between the two parties.

Before leaving foreign relations it is essential to discuss a very difficult question. We know from the Shalmaneser Inscriptions that Ahab participated in the Near East Alliance that fought

[71] Reisner, Fisher and Lyon, op. cit., I, p. 247.

[72] I believe that this thesis explains the rebuke that Isaiah administered to Hezekiah on the occasion of Morodach Baladan's embassy. Is. 39 and II Kings, 20: 12–20. It is generally assumed that the purpose of this visit was to form an alliance against Assyria. The biblical texts corroborate this interpretation of the purposes of the mission. The texts clearly demonstrate that Isaiah's objections were due to religious and not political causes.

and temporarily checked Assyria's ambitions in the West in the Battle of Qarqar, in 853 B.C. Ahab ranked with Damascus and Hamat as the leading powers of the Alliance. He contributed 2,000 chariots (a larger number than Solomon had at his command — 1,400)[73] and 10,000 infantry.[74] Yet nothing of this is recorded in Scriptures.

Historians, with unanimity, agree that the prophetic group opposed this alliance, which is also in accord with my thesis. They further contend that, since subsequent events proved the prophetic party mistaken in that the Allied Powers were victorious at Qarqar, this campaign was deleted from the book of Kings by its editors who espoused the prophetic cause.[75] I hold that this conclusion is not warranted. For did not Shalmaneser return, again and again, between 853 and 841? Did he not completely subdue Hamat? Did he not subsequently likewise defeat and devastate Aram? — and threaten to capture Damascus itself? [76] These subsequent defeats which actually vindicated the prophetic policy are also not mentioned in biblical records, despite their real political significance for Israel.

Moreover, Shalmaneser informs us that in 841 B.C. Jehu, then at the beginning of his reign, paid him tribute.[77] This payment need not be regarded as a symbol of permanent submission or inferiority. It was rather a token of amity. That is, it signalized a change of policy. Henceforth Jehu as the king of Israel would not participate in anti-Assyrian intrigues and alliances. The payments of the Phoenician cities were of the same type and betokened that they were not anti-Assyrian.[78]

[73] I Kings 10: 47.

[74] The Monolith Inscriptions, Rogers, Cuneiform Inscriptions, p. 296.

[75] A. T. Olmstead, History of Syria and Palestine, p. 385. J. M. P. Smith, Am. Journal of Theology, XXIII, p. 290.

[76] See Assyrian Inscriptions, Rogers, op. cit., pp. 288-304.

[77] Obelisk Inscription, Rogers, op. cit., p. 304. In his History of Babylonia and Assyria, Rogers calls Jehu a "natural coward." This is unwarranted. He simply executed the policy of his party, the prophetic party, which put him in power to abandon the Western alliance against Assyria.

[78] In the reign of Ashurnazirpal as well as in that of Shalmaneser III. That Jehu's tribute was not regarded as a permanent arrangement may be seen from the fact that in 838, three years after Jehu's tribute payment, when Assyria attacked Damascus, Israel — and Jehu was then its king — did not pay tribute, nor did any other Palestine

This would be, and no doubt was, in consonance with prophetic policy. And this fact too is unnoticed in the Bible. I therefore venture the opinion that these facts were not recorded by the compilers because they did not conform with their purposes. This explanation is particularly plausible because the editors were not history-conscious, objective historians. For that matter what modern historian is? The biblical writers were palpably religious teachers who interpreted Israel's history from the theocentric point of view.

Historians, as a rule, assume that the Western anti-Assyrian Confederacy lapsed immediately after the battle of Qarqar, and that Israel and her dependencies did not participate in the military efforts to check Shalmaneser's subsequent invasions of the West. This assumption is advanced on the basis that the Assyrian records, with the exception of the Monolith, do not specifically designate Israel as a member of the Western allies. It seems to me that this argument is not valid. For the Monolith Inscription is the original record of the campaign that resulted in the Qarqar battle. The scribe had, therefore, plenty of space to enumerate the important kingdoms and their rulers who participated in the war against Assyria. The other monuments of Shalmaneser's western campaigns, however, just summarize this earlier campaign and detail only the current one. And since the summary of the record mentions only "Bir-idri of Damascus and Irkhuleni of Hamat together with twelve kings of the seacoast," the same form was used probably for this group of princes in the recording of the contemporary campaign.[79] Hence it does not follow that Israel did not participate in the defense of the West after 853 (Qarqar).

Moreover Ahab died shortly after the battle of Qarqar. His

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state. Rogers in his History, II, p. 83, admits that "there was absolutely no recognition of the supremacy of Assyria."

Adad Nirari IV (810–782) invaded the West several times. His records claim that he collected tribute from various states, including Israel. This again proves that tribute payment signified that the payer intended to remain neutral in the war — not aid the attacker nor help the invaded. In other words, in antiquity neutrality had to be bought from the stronger power. See the Calah Inscription in Rogers, Cuneiform Parallels, pp. 205–206.

[79] A. T. Olmstead, Assyrian Historiography, pp. 15–28.

sons and successors were not powerful personalities. Ahazyahu died soon after his enthronement. Jehoram was confronted with rebellion on the part of his dependent principalities, which he attempted to suppress.[80] He certainly could not bring into the field the armament that his father Ahab commanded. And this may account for the placing of his name among the anonymous "twelve kings of the seacoast" in the Assyrian inscriptions.

As already pointed out, Jehu in 841 paid tribute to Shalmaneser. This, despite Assyrian claims, must not be conceived of as a permanent annual payment, as a symbol of dependence, of submission. It was rather a gift sent as a token of amity, as a sign that he was neutral and no longer a member of the anti-Assyrian alliance, which, in all probability, had already lapsed when Hazael, having slain his predecessor, came to the throne of Damascus.

Therefore I conclude that Jehu, in accordance with prophetic policy, upon assuming the crown, withdrew from the anti-Assyrian alliance, but that up to this time Israel was a member thereof.

This thesis is of necessity subject to objections. If Ahab did not leave the confederacy immediately after the battle of Qarqar, how could he attack soon thereafter Ramoth Gilead, the stronghold of his ally? Moreover, if the alliance still held during Jehoram's reign, how could Damascus besiege the same stronghold in 841, just before the Jehu revolt?

The answer to these objections is simple. The problem of the Ephraimite-Syrian wars during the Elijah-Elisha era is very complex. Hence none of the phases of these wars, in my opinion, may be used either to bolster up or to weaken a thesis which purports to explain a contemporaneous question.

This however may be said. Ahab, after the battle of Qarqar, attacked Ramoth Gilead because he believed that this fortress had been promised to him by Ben Hadad. Having returned with his army from the Assyrian campaign, he, without scruples, attacked it. In the attack he died, though his forces captured it.

During the turmoil of Jehoram's reign, with Moab in revolt and Judaea occupied with Edom and Philistia, Hazael, already

[80] II Kings 1: 1; 3: 4–27. In the case of Judah II Kings 9: 22.

on the throne of Aram, utilized the opportunity to recapture Ramoth Gilead, a key fortress commanding the caravan routes, from the ally of his predecessor.

Evidently the two states disputed the sovereignty of this city, and no agreement was reached. So each tried to obtain and to hold it by force — without a formal disruption of relations or actual declaration of war. History presents innumerable comparable incidents where allies have disputed the ownership of some territory and utilized the opportune moment to resolve the dispute by a *fait accompli*. Such, in my opinion, was the controversy over Ramoth Gilead.

It must be noted that the calumny which historians heap upon the prophetic group for their opposition to the foreign policy of the Omri family is undeserved. Professor Olmstead, in his History of Assyria, writes: "There is the greatest disproportion between the indemnity, the contribution paid when the King (of Assyria) must go to the trouble and expense of a campaign and the yearly tribute handed over in the capital. . . . This system aimed to favor submission since it was cheaper to pay tribute than indemnity." [81]

Is it not conceivable that the prophets, in addition to their religious scruples, objected to foreign alliances on the economic grounds explained by Professor Olmstead?

We know that Ahab furnished a huge armament at Qarqar for a King with his resources. Its maintenance, even assuming that Judaea shared in it, must have been exhausting, the tax burden back-breaking. And despite it all, victory was a gamble.

The prophets were consequently justified in insisting on neutrality even though it involved the payment of tribute. It at least assured peace without the devastation of invasion and the loss of independence. The Phoenician coast cities pursued this policy according to contemporary Assyrian records.[82]

[81] P. 130.

[82] Tyre began to pay tribute in 858 B.C. and continued to do so throughout Shalmaneser's campaigns in the West. Tyre even sent tribute to Ashurnazirpal, in 875. I hold that this does not signify that Tyre therewith impaired its sovereignty. All it meant was that Tyre thereby showed that it desired to be neutral, not to participate in the anti-Assyrian confederacy. And as stated, neutrality had to be purchased and paid for.

Furthermore, the sacrifices involved in the preparations for war with Assyria were useless: victory, from the prophetic viewpoint, was nigh inconceivable. For YHWH, under the prevailing conditions, would not vouchsafe victory. May not the prophets have appraised the power of Assyria and realistically determined that war was foolhardy and a waste of human and economic resources? [83]

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One more source of antagonism requires elucidation — the economic policy of the Omri Dynasty. Omri planned that his capital should become a commercial metropolis. His alliances with the Phoenician cities had this end in view and his peace arrangements with Damascus facilitated participation in the caravan trade. His successors, especially Ahab, who, in many respects, emulated Solomon, also pursued this end. Ahab was a vast builder. He amassed huge armaments. He together with Jehoshophat of Judah was interested in the Red Sea trade. The continuous struggle to capture and to hold Ramoth Gilead was to assure larger participation in the caravan business. After his victory at Aphek Ahab forced the king of Damascus to permit the establishment of businesses by Israelitish merchants in his city, a privilege which hitherto the Aramaean business houses had enjoyed in Samaria.[84] The close coöperation with Tyre, a commercial and industrial center, aided the urbanization of the country.[85]

All this activity required resources which could only become available through the expansion of commerce. The beneficiaries of this trade activity were mainly the urban population, particularly the people of Samaria. The rural population, under the circumstances, was neglected, and heavily taxed. If

[83] Curiously, historians who condemn the Elijah-Elisha opposition to Ahab's foreign policy and the war against Assyria also attack the zealots of 70 A.D. for fighting against Rome. I submit that if the zealots are held to have been fanatical and foolhardy in measuring their strength with imperial Rome, the prophets should be applauded for their wise statesmanship in declining to sanction the war with imperial Assyria. In all fairness both cannot be damned by the same historians.

[84] I Kings 20: 34.

[85] For corroboration see Palestine Exploration Fund, Quarterly Statement, 1933, p. 24.

the situation in Solomon's era is applicable, as I believe it is, we may surmise the economic conditions of Israel at this time. The city dwellers became influential and wealthy, and lived luxuriously; the rural communities lost their influence and had to foot the bill. The severe droughts of this period aggravated further their economic plight.[86]

Some of the facts in the Elisha folk tales bear out this view. The Shunemite woman, described as a great personage, declined all assistance from Elisha. Her answer to his offer of aid, "I live among my people," is probably typical of the well-being of the "great." [87] On the other hand, the poor widow appeals to Elisha to help her satisfy the creditor who "is come to take unto him my two children to be bondmen." [88] This too may be regarded as characteristic. We know that the literary prophets continually condemned the prevailing economic abuses which produced, as by-products, lascivious luxury and the hankering after the licentious pageantry of paganism, and dull peonage, patiently bearing its burdens. We may safely assume that the Elijah prophetic group looked askance at this economic development, particularly since it was connected with the growth of Baalism in the land.[89]

In this connection it must be noted that the prophetic faction was of rural composition. Elijah was a Gileadite, probably of a shepherd family.[90] Elisha was a farmer.[91] The husband of the poor widow who appealed to Elisha to save her children from bondage was a member of the prophetic guild.[92] Evidently quite a poor man! The prophetic groups, in the Elisha tales, are certainly rural and poor.[93] The Rechabites, desert dwellers, bitter opponents of city civilization, fanatical adherents of the desert tradition, joined the prophets after Jehu's triumph.[94] All these individual facts tend to prove that the prophets of this period were rural folk.

This contrast in economic background contributed quite naturally to the clash between the two antagonistic parties.

[86] I Kings 17: 1; 18: 1
[87] II Kings 4: 8-14.
[88] II Kings 4: 1-8.
[89] See note 41.
[90] I Kings 17: 11.
[91] I Kings 19: 19.
[92] II Kings 4: 1.
[93] See the folk stories in II Kings.
[94] See note 41.

And without doubt it supplied its full share in the animosity that produced the final flare-up.[95]

From the marshalled facts it must be quite evident that the Jehu revolt resulted from a plurality of causes. The clash of personalities was too fierce and the difference of interpretation in respect of the economic, political and religious aspects of the current scene too fundamental to be stilled. There could be no peace between practical political rulers as typified in the royal court and the religious zealots of the Elijah-Elisha prophets. One had to go. And the prophets had sufficient political and practical ingenuity to plot and to execute the coup which brought the Omri dynasty to a violent end.

[95] The same struggle went on in Judaea. See Robert Godis, Sectional Rivalry in the Kingdom of Judah, Jewish Quarterly Review, XXV, No. 3, Jan. 1935.

AN EPIGRAM OF THE FIFTH CENTURY B.C.

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Τλέμονες, *hoῖον ἀγῶνα μάχες τελέσαντες ἀελπ*[⏑̄]
φσυχὰς δαιμονίος ὀλέσατ' ἐμ πολέμοι·
οὐ κατὰ δ[*υσ*]*μενέ*[*ο*]*ν ἀν*[*δ*]*ρῶν σθένος, ἀλλά τις hυμᾶς*
hεμιθέον θείαν [– ⏑ ⏑]*ν ἀντιάσας*
ἔβλαφσεν πρόφρον [*ca* 10]*δε δύσμαχον ἄγραν*
ἐχθροῖς θερεύσας [*ca* 8 *h*]*υμετέροι*
σὺν κακοῖ ἐχσετέλεσσε· βροτοῖσι δὲ πᾶσι τὸ λοιπὸν
φράζεσθαι λογίον πιστὸν ἔθηκε τέλος.

This inscription,[1] which was discovered some years ago in the Ceramicus, has been assigned on epigraphic grounds to the middle of the fifth century and Peek has conjectured with some probability that it is a memorial to the men who fell in the battle of Coronea. Their defeat and death is ascribed to supernatural intervention and the development of this topic has given the poem a form which bears little resemblance to that of the usual official epigram of the classical period. Apart from its historical and literary interest, the inscription is of importance as a religious document and the primary aim of this article is to examine its language in some detail, with a view to elucidating the religious ideas underlying it and to determining, if possible, its relation to the event which it records.

L. 1. The usage of the word *τλήμονες* is conveniently summarized by Aristarchus on Iliad X, 231: *ὅτι τλήμονα οἱ νεώτεροι τὸν ἀτυχῆ, ὁ δὲ Ὅμηρος τὸν τλητικόν, τὸν ὑπομενητικόν.* Though the writer may have been conscious of other implications, it seems probable that the predominant meaning of the word here, as a

[1] Peek, Ath. Mitt. 57 (1932), p. 142; Hermes 68 (1933), p. 353; Ath. Mitt. 59 (1934), p. 252. Bowra, C. Q. 32 (1938), p. 80. Reinhardt, Hermes 73 (1938), p. 234. Reference to these articles is understood throughout. I am indebted to Professor A. D. Nock for many helpful criticisms and suggestions.

vocative[2] and as the first emphatic word of an epitaph, is ἀτυχεῖς. The fate of the dead, as we shall see, is represented as παρὰ δόξαν and, by implication, φοβερόν; τλήμονες expresses the pity which it arouses.

ἀελπ[˘]: The supplements ἄελπτον or ἀέλπτου and ἀέλπτως are epigraphically admissible, but of the two adjectival forms the latter is favored by the balance of the line and we may consider the choice as lying between ἀέλπτου and ἀέλπτως. A possible meaning of the adjective is 'hopeless' or 'desperate.' For this sense Liddell-Scott-Jones quote only two examples (h. Hom. III, 91; Aesch., Suppl. 907), but the word occurs elsewhere[3] and persists late in this usage. It is found for example in the Orphic Argonautica 940 (935): διζόμεθ' οἶμον ἄελπτον ὀιζυροῖο πόνοιο, where Hermann already quotes the Homeric hymn and notes: male vertit Gesnerus viam insperatam quod dicere desperatam debebat. This sense is not inappropriate, but, in view of the later development of the poem, it seems best to look for a different interpretation of the line. The word ἄελπτος may mean in some contexts little more than 'unexpected,' but, as Reinhardt has rightly pointed out, though he does not sufficiently develop his observation, it has certain religious associations which make it specially suitable here. It is in fact the earlier and poetical equivalent of παράδοξος and like it belongs to the terminology of the miraculous. This use will be discussed and illustrated more fully below in relation to the word πιστόν, which belongs to the same pattern of thought; in the meantime, anticipating later results, we may assume that the idea to be expressed is that of unexpected disaster, such as might lend itself to explanation by miraculous intervention. Such a sense might possibly be obtained from the reading ἀέλπτου; ἄελπτος μάχη could be so interpreted in relation to the account

[2] The use of the vocative is too common to need illustration; the οἷον clause follows naturally as in Soph., Ajax 641 and Trach. 1112. The idea of endurance is, of course, expressed more than once in classical epigram and may be felt here in τελέσαντες: cf. Wade-Gery, Classical Epigrams and Epitaphs, J. H. S. 53 (1933), p. 74 (E, ταλακάρδιοι), p. 95 (V, οἵτινες ἔτλαν); Τλήμονες in the sense postulated here occurs in F (p. 75), where the idea of endurance is already expressed by μενεγχέας.

[3] Eur., fragm. (Nauck) 100 and 550.

that the Athenians were ambushed at Coronea (Diod. XII, 6, 2). The point, however, is not merely that they were taken by surprise. The context suggests a kind of peripety in their fortunes; it is not the battle, but rather the τέλος which is ἄελπτον. For this reason it is perhaps better to read the adverb ἀέλπτως and to take the line as expressing in poetical language, and with a further implication, what is more prosaically expressed in the Herodotean phrase (VIII, 11, 3): παρὰ δόξαν ἀγωνισάμενοι.

L. 2. The word δαιμονίος may be transliterated δαιμονίως or δαιμονίους and the choice is unfortunately difficult. As far as the form is concerned, analogy is in favor of the adverb, since δαιμόνιος is, apart from a few exceptions, an adjective of three terminations. The familiar colloquial use of the adverb in Aristophanes and other writers has no bearing on our passage, except in so far as it indicates that the associations of the word might make it unsuitable for poetry. Two passages quoted by Liddell-Scott-Jones are more relevant; in Xen., Hell. VII, 4, 3, as the context shows, δαιμονιώτατα means "by an extraordinary chance" and in Plato, Tim. 25e, the connection with τύχη is explicit: δαιμονίως ἔκ τινος τύχης. So also in another passage, Epicharmus 100 (Kaibel), the idea expressed seems to be that of the accidental as opposed to the deliberate:

δέλφακα τε τῶν γειτόνων
τοῖς Ἐλευσινίοις φυλάσσων δαιμονίως ἀπώλεσα
οὐχ ἑκών.

These usages may be grouped with similar uses of the word δαίμων, which is commonly coupled with τύχη.[4] This connection of thought[5] appears very clearly in [Plato], Defin. 411b (τύχη φορὰ ἐξ ἀδήλου εἰς ἄδηλον, καὶ ἡ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτομάτου αἰτία δαιμονίας πράξεως) and in different language at a later date in O. G. I. 458, 15, where κατά τινα θείαν βούλησιν is used to translate the Latin *fortuito*. Where more than mere chance is in question a reinforcement by contrast is felt necessary. So in Aeschines III,

[4] Liddell-Scott-Jones, s.v. κατὰ δαίμονα persists later; e.g. Parth., Erot. Path. IX, 1

[5] See Wilamowitz on Eur., Her. 1228, quoted by Pearson on Soph., fragm. 650.

133: *τήν γε θεοβλάβειαν καὶ τὴν ἀφροσύνην οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνως ἀλλὰ δαιμονίως κτησάμενοι*; and again in Plato, Alc. 103a: *τούτου δὲ τὸ αἴτιον γέγονεν οὐκ ἀνθρώπειον ἀλλά τι δαιμόνιον ἐναντίωμα*. The word is, moreover, in general prosaic and colloquial and no exact parallel is available from serious verse. The nearest approach is perhaps the use of *δαιμονίᾳ* quoted by the lexica from Pindar, Ol. IX (110), a poem in which *κατὰ δαίμονα* also occurs (28). The word refers not to any specific act of divine intervention but to the will of heaven or gift of god which makes men *σοφοί* and *ἀγαθοί*. It is possible that Pindar chose the unusual form *δαιμονίᾳ* as more elevated than *δαιμονίως*, perhaps influenced by the *θεσπεσίῃ* of Iliad II, 367, where the scholiast[6] notes the parallelism. Considerations of usage are thus rather against *δαιμονίως* here, but it may be admitted that in a religious context such as this the word might have been used, with reference to its derivation, in a sense stronger than that which it bore in ordinary speech. Its meaning elsewhere, however, and the vague meaning of *δαιμονίᾳ* and *θεσπεσίῃ* in the passages cited suggest that it would naturally be used, if used at all, not of the intervention of a specific divine agent but of 'an act of god,' an event in which divine agency (*τὸ δαιμόνιον*) was merely conjectured.

Δαιμονίως then is preferable from the formal point of view and affords a suitable sense, but a further objection may be raised on the stylistic ground that it weakly anticipates the marked antithesis of the next line. It is doubtful, however, if this objection is as formidable as it appears at first sight. It is not unusual for the first couplet of an epigram to be self-contained; as Wade-Gery puts it in his comment on the Megarian epigram (p. 95), "the first couplet (as so often) can stand alone and is in the great style." It is true that in epigrams transmitted in literature we have to do on occasion with later amplification, but it is certain that the inconcinnity is sometimes due to the original composer. So in our poem it is possible that a failure in skill has left an awkward joint between the first couplet, which taken by itself conforms to the simple style of classical epigram, and the narrative development which follows. It may

[6] Lobeck, Paralip. Gramm. Gr., p. 361; *θεσπέσιος* coincides in other usages with *δαιμόνιος*.

be added that, if we are right in taking *δαιμονίως* vaguely as equivalent to *κατά τινα θείαν βούλησιν*, the anticipation is not a serious one; the word would indicate that the defeat was due to the will of heaven, but not the method by which that will was carried out. *Δαιμονίως* is not an explicit antithesis to *ἀνδρῶν σθένος* nor does it necessarily imply the agency of a *ἡμίθεος*; it could be taken merely as introducing the theme of divine intervention, while the following antithesis particularizes its nature.

Can a tolerable sense be obtained from the adjective? The form [7] is hardly decisive against it and, in view of the religious character of the poem, it would be not unreasonable to interpret it as implying a kind of heroization of the dead.[8] That the souls of great men occupy a special position after death is one of the most familiar religious conceptions of antiquity and one of the classes of those who enjoy this honor is that of those who have died for their country, the *manus ob patriam pugnando volnera passi* of Virgil's Elysium.[9] The idea, which was no doubt rooted in popular belief, appears as early as Tyrtaeus and Heraclitus and finds clear expression in Plato. In Rep. 468e, with allusion to Hesiod, he asks: *τῶν δὲ δὴ ἀποθανόντων ἐπὶ στρατείας ὃς ἂν εὐδοκιμήσας τελευτήσῃ, ἆρ' οὐ πρῶτον μὲν φήσομεν τοῦ χρυσοῦ γένους εἶναι*; and he goes on to speak of them as *δαιμονίους τε καὶ θείους*. Again in Crat. 398c: *ταύτῃ οὖν τίθεμαι καὶ ἐγὼ πάντ' ἄνδρα ὃς ἂν ἀγαθὸς ᾖ δαιμόνιον εἶναι καὶ ζῶντα καὶ τελευτήσαντα, καὶ ὀρθῶς δαίμονα καλεῖσθαι*. It would be tedious to labor further so familiar a point; the examples cited are sufficient to show that *ψυχὰς δαιμονίους* in our text could be naturally interpreted as reflecting this conception.[10] That the theme is in keeping with

[7] The same point arises with *ἀγλαός*; Wade-Gery, p. 80, n. 35. It is doubtful if much weight can be given to Peek's point that the position after the noun favors the adverb.

[8] Bowra seems to be relying on the very inadequate section of Liddell-Scott-Jones when he rejects *δαιμονίους* on the ground that it does not seem to be used of human beings with a suggestion of "a rising above the mortal state."

[9] Aeneid VI, 660; cf. Norden, p. 34. Tyrtaeus IX, 31 ff. (Diehl); Heracl. 24 and perhaps 53 (Diels).

[10] Cf. also more generally Plato, Politicus 309c: *τὴν τῶν καλῶν καὶ δικαίων πέρι καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν τούτοις ἐναντίων ὄντως οὖσαν ἀληθῆ δόξαν μετὰ βεβαιώσεως, ὁπόταν ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνηται, θείαν φημὶ ἐν δαιμονίῳ γίγνεσθαι γένει*. The idea of the *ψυχή* as *οἰκητήριον δαίμονος* (Democr. 171) is rather different.

an epitaph on men slain in battle is proved further, if it were necessary, by the recurrence in the prose ἐπιτάφιοι λόγοι of the topic of the εὐδαιμονία and heroization of the slain.[11] Stylistically the adjective is superior in that it does not weaken by any anticipation the antithesis which immediately follows.

It will be seen that a reasonable case can be made for either transliteration. In spite of difficulties, I incline with much hesitation to δαιμονίως, not on the ground that δαιμονίους cannot give a tolerable sense, but on the ground that the primary aim of the poem is to present the Athenian defeat as an example of divine intervention. It might be objected that we have already found the idea of miraculous intervention in the word ἀέλπτως, but ἀέλπτως is hardly an explicit anticipation of δαιμονίως.[12] It would be true to say that it is appropriate as an element in miracle description rather than that in itself it necessarily implies the miraculous.

ἐν πολέμῳ: The poem lacks the designation of the dead and the indication of the place of battle; the information may have been supplied on another part of the monument to which the inscription belonged.[13] The simple ἐν πολέμῳ recalls the formula common on private graves of Sparta and Laconia.[14]

Ll. 3–4. The ascription of defeat to supernatural agency is a theme appropriate to epitaph. Divine intervention is a kind of topic of consolation; the dead would have been a match for human foes, had their hands not been supernaturally strengthened.[15]

[11] Lysias, Epit. 80; Dem. LX, 33; Isocr., Pan. 84. Cf. Aristeides, ὑπὲρ τῶν τεττάρων, p. 284 (δαιμονίους).

[12] In view of the structure of the couplet, I do not regard the use of two adverbs as a serious objection to the reading adopted above.

[13] The place of battle is omitted also in the 'Tanagra' epitaph; Wade-Gery, p. 79. Cf. Paus. I, 29, 4: ἐστᾶσιν ἐπὶ τοῖς τάφοις στῆλαι τὰ ὀνόματα καὶ τὸν δῆμον ἑκάστου λέγουσαι.

[14] Schwyzer, Dial. Gr. Ex. 17, 47.

[15] Cf. Eur., Bacch. 1127:

οὐχ ὑπὸ σθένους
ἀλλ' ὁ θεὸς εὐμάρειαν ἐπεδίδου χεροῖν.

Cf. Virgil, Aen. V, 466: non viris alias conversaque numina sentis?

This theme is strikingly expressed in the epigram on the Athenians who died at Syracuse: [16]

οἵδε Συρακοσίους ὀκτὼ νίκας ἐκράτησαν
ἄνδρες, ὅτ' ἦν τὰ θεῶν ἐξ ἴσου ἀμφοτέροις,

and its vitality may be illustrated by its recurrence in the epitaph of a gladiator [17] of the Roman period:

ἔκτινέ με δαίμων, οὐχ ὁ ἐπίορκος Πίννας.

The motive is not a late one; it occurs already in Homer's description of the death of Patroclus [18] and Herodotus [19] furnishes a good example (V, 87, 2): Ἀργεῖοι μὲν λέγουσι αὐτῶν τὸ Ἀττικὸν στρατόπεδον διαφθειράντων τὸν ἕνα τοῦτον περιγενέσθαι, Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ τοῦ δαιμονίου. So too in the pious Xenophon [20] we find more than once the idea that human skill and courage may be baffled by fate; for example: ἡ δ' ἀληθὴς ἀνδραγαθία, ἢν μὴ θεὸς βλάπτῃ, ἀεὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι λαμπροτέραν τὴν εὔκλειαν συμπαρέχεται. It is this same conception which finds expression in the epigram on the dead of Chaeronea: [21]

ἀρετὴ δ' ἐκ δείματος οὐκ ἐσάωσεν
ψυχάς.

It will be remarked in the examples quoted that the supernatural agency is left vague, and so also in our poem the designation of the divine agent as ἡμιθέων τις [22] cannot fail to recall

[16] Plut., Nic. 17, quoted by Bowra, p. 86.

[17] Kaibel, Ep. Gr. 529.

[18] Il. XVI, 847 ff.; cf. Finsler, Homer I², pp. 176 f.

[19] Cf. VIII, 109, 3, for attribution of victory to the gods.

[20] Symp. 43; cf. de re equ. XI, 13 (ἢν μή τι δαιμόνιον κωλύῃ) and Oec. V, 13 (ἢν μὴ θεὸς ἀποκωλύῃ).

[21] Dem., De Cor. 289, quoted by Bowra, p. 86.

[22] I am unable to find a parallel for the use of ἡμίθεος here; the ἡμίθεοι are as a rule not a class of supernatural beings, they are "a species of men not of spirits or daimones" (Rohde, Psyche c. iv, n. 23). I have assumed that our writer is using the word as equivalent to ἥρως, though the heroes were not necessarily ἡμίθεοι; the terms seem to be identified in Plato, Crat. 398c: οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι ἡμίθεοι οἱ ἥρωες; The identification may have been assisted by Hesiod, Op., 159 ff. It is possible also that the word is being used as equivalent to δαίμων; see Plato, Ap., 27d–e with the significant play on ἡμίονος. I have used the word 'god' without prejudice to the interpretation of ἡμίθεος.

the frequent use of θεῶν τις in describing 'acts of god.' If we are right in relying on this analogy, it is not likely that the writer had in mind a particular identifiable agent. We may, I think, go further and conclude that our text offers not the record of an actual epiphany, but rather a *post eventum* interpretation of defeat. Here, as often elsewhere, we meet the difficulty of deciding upon the authenticity of a record of religious experience. The use in our poem of what is clearly a conventional motive would not by itself be enough to prove that the intervention was mere literary fiction, since real experience may conform to established patterns and does so particularly in the religious sphere. Nor is the form of the expression ἡμιθέων τις decisive; an unidentified heroic figure might have been seen in the enemy ranks. In battle epiphany, as in the appearance of a *deus ex machina*, identification of the god is not a matter of immediate perception, but rather of subsequent ratiocination or explanation.[23] If, however, we consider the vagueness of expression in conjunction with the conventionality of form, the most natural hypothesis is that the basis of the poem is an Athenian defeat attributed after the event, like that in Herodotus, to supernatural agency. That the intervention is ascribed to a being of the category of the hero may at first sight suggest that the theory of real epiphany and identified divine agent is to be preferred to that which has been suggested. A 'hero' was no doubt chosen, however, because it is the function of heroes to aid their countrymen in battle. Our writer is following a common practice of poets in giving life and color to his material by personification; he passes from the vague δαιμονίως to the more individual ἡμιθέων τις and proceeds, as we shall see, to describe his intervention in terms of another religious motive, that of epiphany description. We have no means of deciding whether the religious interpretation of the defeat was current in Athens after the battle or was simply adopted by the poet as a theme suitable for epitaph. On either view it is super-

[23] Cf. Denniston on Eur., El. 1233–7: "When gods appear at the end of a tragedy, their divinity is always recognized at once by chorus or actor, their identity never." It may be added that the identification of a hostile 'hero,' either immediately or afterwards, is less likely than that of a friendly and native one.

fluous to seek to identify a supernatural agent.[24] By the ordinary man, we may be sure, the disaster would have been attributed to τὸ δαιμόνιον or to θεῶν τις and the poet has not been more explicit.

This supernatural interpretation of events as a feature of the religious attitude and as a literary motive will concern us again later. The examples we have quoted relate to death in battle, but the topic occurs in other contexts. It will be remembered that in the Antigone (1272) Creon, after the event, attributes his fatal course to the assault of some god who has led him astray. The assault is pictured in vivid terms which recall those of our poem:

ἔχω μαθὼν δείλαιος· ἐν δ' ἐμῷ κάρᾳ
θεὸς τότ' ἄρα τότε μέγα βάρος μ' ἔχων
ἔπαισεν, ἐν δ' ἔσεισεν ἀγρίαις ὁδοῖς.

L. 4. The phrase θείαν [–˘˘]ν ἀντιάσας presents a special problem. The letters [εισοδο]ν have been inserted by a later hand after the loss of the first surface of the stone and they not only violate the stoichedon arrangement, but give a form (εις) which is not in keeping with the orthography of the original inscription. As Peek points out, it would be natural to suppose that the violation of the stoichedon arrangement was due simply to the corrector and that the original had εσοδον without the aspirate; nevertheless he rejects εισοδον and conjectures [ἥλυσι]ν as more suitable to the context. This view is not unreasonable, since it seems not improbable that a restorer who violated the stoichedon arrangement and introduced a different orthography may have done his work some considerable time after the inscription was cut and without knowledge of the original. Bowra assumes "that the first cutter made a mistake

[24] Bowra chooses Orion on the ground that he "stood somewhat in the same relation to the Boeotians as Heracles did to the Peloponnesians," but Heracles might well help the Thebans; see the amusing fable (Babrius 15) in which the Theban concludes a discussion with an Athenian on the merits of their national heroes with the words:

πέπαυσο· νικᾷς· τοιγαροῦν χολωθείη
Θησεὺς μὲν ἡμῖν, Ἡρακλῆς δ' Ἀθηναίοις.

and omitted a letter, while the corrector knowing the right sense wrote εισοδον at the cost of some violation to the stoichedon arrangement." This is a possible view, but it is dangerous to assume an error in a lost original and it is a little difficult to see why a corrector who knew the original did not restore a form in keeping with the orthography. It is possible then, as Peek holds, that εισοδον should be regarded merely as an ancient conjecture.[25] The necessity of assuming an error adds greatly to the probability of his view, but there is a certain irregularity in the insertion of the aspirate in inscriptions of this period and it is possible that it was omitted here. In any case we are not absolved from the attempt to explain εισοδον which, even if a later insertion, is an ancient reading.

With regard to the interpretation two courses have been followed. Bowra, accepting εισοδον, reads εἰς ὁδόν and argues ingeniously that the θεία ὁδός is the sacred way to the temple of Athena Itonia, near which the Boeotians set up their trophy. Here, he holds, the hero Orion took the field against the Athenians. This reading gives a natural grammatical structure, but it is open to several objections. The emphatic contrast between ἡμιθέων and θείαν is surely rather frigid, if its point lies in an obscure allusion to Athena as the patroness of Athens. In the second place the use of θεῖος is difficult. It is true that it is sometimes used in a vague sense which recalls that of ἱερός in Homer, but it would be difficult to parallel the phrase θεία ὁδός as a specific local designation. For this purpose ἱερὰ ὁδός was the standard usage and ἱερός is the adjective constantly used in place names; Hierapolis for instance but not Theiapolis.[26] It is true, however, that the poet might have wished to avoid the stereotyped phrase and θεία ὁδός in this sense cannot be regarded as quite impossible. Perhaps the chief difficulty in Bowra's view is the obscurity of the allusion; the very large number of sacred ways[27] in Greece would have made it ambiguous even

[25] Ath. Mitt. 59 (1934), p. 253; he does not regard violation of the stoichedon arrangement as an objection to εἴσοδον (Bowra, p. 81), which he assumes might be a later orthography for ἔσοδον.

[26] Cf. the fine distinction in Theocritus XXV, 10: ἱερὸν θείοιο παρὰ ῥόον Ἀλφειοῖο.

[27] Cf. Kern, Rel. d. Gr. I, pp. 99 f.; hence the sacral term κελευθοποιοί (Pfister, Rel. d. Gr. u. R., Bursians Jahresb. 1930, p. 384).

for contemporaries. For an Athenian indeed ἱερὰ ὁδός without further qualification could hardly mean anything but the sacred way to Eleusis. This difficulty would be less, if we could take θεία ὁδός not of an obscure and conjectural sacred way but of one of the most famous of all, the ἱερὰ ὁδός from Delphi which ran through Boeotia and seems to have passed Coronea. The fame of this way would make the allusion more comprehensible and in regard to it, as the way by which Apollo once travelled, the adjective θείαν would be less unusual. Even so, however, the reference would be too obscure.

If we abandon the attempt to find in these words an indication of the place of battle, we must look for some qualification of ἀντιάσας which will enforce the contrast between the δυσμενεῖς ἄνδρες and the action of the god. The juxtaposition of ἡμιθέων and θείαν to some extent favors Peek's view that the restoration demanded is an internal accusative with ἀντιάσας. As we have seen, he rejects εἴσοδον and conjectures ἧλυσιν. The weakness of the word is no great objection, since the function of an internal accusative of this kind is simply to carry the adjective. The emphasis on this view lies on θείαν, which is not a contrast to ἡμιθέων, but a reinforcement of it.[28] On this line of interpretation can any satisfactory sense be obtained from εἴσοδον? As implying motion the word could naturally enough be used as an internal accusative with ἀντιάσας; the difficulty lies in the meaning.[29] In later Greek (Acts, 13, 24) it seems to be used of the incarnation in a sense close to that of ἐπιφάνεια and corresponding to that of the Latin *adventus*, which is common in a similar religious usage.[30] If this interpretation of the word were tolerable, we should have a parallel to the form of expres-

[28] Θεῖος is, of course, more general in its application than θεός.

[29] For the abstract uses of εἴσοδος the following points may be added to the article in Liddell-Scott-Jones. (1) Entrance on magistracy, O. G. I. 458, 15. (2) Entrance of a spirit in demoniac possession, Aretaeus (Hude) III, 4, 2; for this sense ἔφοδος is familiar from Hipp., περὶ ἱερ. νόσ. IV (ἡρώων ἐφόδους). (3) For the doctor's visit, add Hipp., περὶ εὐσχημ. (Heiberg) 12, 13; Menander 1112 (C. A. F. III, 269). (4) For the legal sense, add Dem. XLII, 2. (5) In Aesch., Eumen. 30 it may have a semi-technical ritual sense.

[30] Cf. the use of πρόοδος in Julian, contra Christ. 200A (Neumann). Professor Nock points out that the use of εἴσοδος in Acts may be derived from Malachi 3, 2. See Suicerus, Thes. Eccles., s.v.

sion[31] in the semi-religious language of Sophocles, Electra 1273:

ἰὼ χρόνῳ μακρῷ φιλτάταν
ὁδὸν ἐπαξιώσας ὧδέ μοι φανῆναι.

It would be difficult, however, to find early evidence for this sense of divine visitation. Two further possibilities suggest themselves. Firstly, that εἴσοδος is used unusually in the sense of ἔφοδος or πρόσοδος of hostile approach; secondly, that the word is to be taken metaphorically of entrance into the lists, a sense for which the lexica quote Pindar, Pythian VI, 50.[32] This meaning might be not impossible, but, in view of the striking metaphor of the hunt which follows immediately, it is rather unnatural to assume agonistic imagery here. Our conclusion must be, I think, that, while εἴσοδον is grammatically and stylistically attractive, none of the senses which it can naturally bear carry conviction in this passage.

It remains to inquire if θείαν εἰς ὁδόν can give a suitable sense as an adverbial qualification of ἀντιάσας. Since Reinhardt, who takes this view, makes no serious attempt to establish it, some examination of relevant usage may be permitted. In Sophocles, Ajax 1254, ὀρθὸς εἰς ὁδὸν πορεύεται hardly means with Jebb that the bull "is brought straight into the road (from which it has strayed)," but rather simply that it is kept walking straight along the road, that is ὀρθὴν ὁδόν (Theognis 945). This adverbial usage may perhaps be paralleled in Sophocles, fragm. 760 (Nauck): βᾶτ' εἰς ὁδὸν δὴ πᾶς ὁ χειρῶναξ λεώς, though there the idea of entering upon the road might be implied. These passages, it is true, are distinguished from ours by the absence of an adjective, but there is a close parallel in Pindar, Ol. VI, 72: ἐς φανερὰν ὁδὸν ἔρχονται. In this case the meaning is hardly different from that of the common constructions with ἀνά, ἐν, κατά, or the dative and accusative alone. It seems possible, then, grammatically that θείαν εἰς ὁδόν may be equivalent to θείᾳ ὁδῷ or θείαν ὁδόν.[33] Reinhardt, if I understand him rightly,

[31] See also Jebb on Trach. 159 and Kaibel on El. 418 (δευτέραν ὁμιλίαν ἐλθόντος, of an apparition).

[32] Cf. Pyth. V, 116 and Soph., El. 685, εἰσέρχεται.

[33] This use of εἰς ὁδόν is to be distinguished from that in which the idea of meet-

takes the phrase in an abstract sense; the divine way is the method of infatuation which leads men to destruction. This involves a meaning of βλάπτειν which is rejected below and I take the phrase as reflecting the imagery of epiphany. As Orestes, whose return is constantly pictured by Electra in terms of epiphany, comes φιλτάταν ὁδόν, so our ἡμίθεος comes θείαν εἰς ὁδόν. When the gods appear, they appear in a manner which is not that of men, "by a path divine"; so when the Dioscuri appear overhead in the Electra of Euripides (1235) the chorus acclaims them as gods:

οὐ γὰρ θνητῶν γ'
ἥδε κελευθός.

We may compare also the hymn of Pindar (Bowra 10) in which Themis is conveyed to Olympus λιπαρὰν καθ' ὁδόν and the description of Zeus in Euripides (Troades 885) as δι' ἀψόφου βαίνων κελευθοῦ.[34] Particular paths of the gods from heaven to earth are not in question, though there is evidence for that conception later.[35] The idea is more general; in both the abstract and the literal sense the gods move in mysterious ways. So when the ἡμίθεος comes to battle he comes by a θεία ὁδός unseen and unheard.

This interpretation of the phrase is well suited to the context of our inscription and, in spite of the grammatical difficulty which it involves, seems preferable to the others which we have discussed above.

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ing is involved. The lion in the path is a familiar image in Homer (Il. XV, 271) and the gods like highwaymen often meet men in the way. This is perhaps the meaning in Ajax 36, rather than "entering on the route by which Ajax must pass" (Jebb). See O. Becker, Das Bild des Weges (Hermes, Einzelschriften 4), pp. 16, 46.

[34] We might add Pindar, Pyth. X, 29:

ναυσὶ δ' οὔτε πεζὸς ἰὼν κεν εὕροις
ἐς Ὑπερβορέων ἀγῶνα θαυματὰν ὁδόν.

[35] Gundel, R.-E. VII, 1, col. 560 ff., s.v. Γαλαξίας. For the topic see also Dio Chrys. I, 65 (ἄγει λαβὼν αὐτὸν ἄφραστον καὶ ἄβατον ἀνθρώποις ὁδόν) and Hermae Pastor, Vis. I, 1, 3 (καὶ πνεῦμά με ἔλαβεν καὶ ἀπήνεγκέν με δι' ἀνοδίας τινός, δι' ἧς ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἐδύνατο ὁδεῦσαι). Cf. perhaps Hdwtb. des deutschen Abergl. I, 726 (Jesu Pfad).

Ll. 4–5. Both Bowra and Peek assume that the phrase *ἀντιάσας ἔβλαψεν* refers to active intervention by the 'hero' in battle, but the language does not in itself impose this sense and we have already seen reason to adopt a different view. The action of the *ἡμίθεος* is, however, pictured as an epiphany and *ἀντιάσας* is appropriately chosen, since, though it can be used simply of hostile encounter, *ἀντιάζω* (*ἀντιάω*) is technical in epiphany description. The appearance of the gods to men is constantly described as a meeting,[36] as in Iliad X, 551:

ἀλλά τιν' ὔμμ' ὀΐω δόμεναι θεὸν ἀντιάσαντα.

Such meetings are not necessarily hostile; in our poem it is the context which gives the notion of hostility. This view of *ἀντιάσας* is in keeping with the interpretation which we have adopted for *θείαν εἰς ὁδόν*;[37] it is not the opposition, but the appearance of the god which is thus qualified.

The word *βλάπτειν* is taken by Reinhardt to indicate the hurt caused by that infatuation which leads men to commit fatal acts of folly.[38] Taking the word in this sense we might go further and see a contrast familiar in Greek between *σθένος* (more commonly *κράτος* or *βία*) and *δόλος* or *ἀπάτη*.[39] On this view the action of the *ἡμίθεος* is like that of the *κακὸς δαίμων* of the Persae (353, 725). This interpretation is in some respects attractive, but it may for various reasons be rejected. The emphatic aorist *ἔβλαψεν*, like the emphatic *ἔπαισεν* in the passage of the Antigone (1274) cited above,[40] more naturally indicates destruction than the preliminary process of mental blinding; the imagined epiphany is pictured as a battle epiphany; lastly, there

[36] Pfister, R.-E. Suppl. IV, col. 280.

[37] This use of *ἀντιάσας* would agree well also with Bowra's view of *θείαν εἰς ὁδόν*; cf. Hdt. IX, 6 (*ἡντίασαν ἐς τὴν Βοιωτίην*) and I, 166, 2. *Σύμβολοι* and *συναντήσεις* are *ἐνόδιοι* (Aesch., P. V. 502) and a local reference is natural; cf. Apollod. Bibl. I, 9,11 (*περὶ τὸν Ἀλφειὸν συντυχών*) Diod. XV, 52, 3 (*περὶ τὰς πύλας ἀπήντησε*), Pindar, Pyth. VIII, 57 ff. In this matter the gods are like robbers (above, n. 33); see Schulze, Kl. Schr., p. 167, n. 6, for *ἐν ὁδῷ*, and compare the similar use of *ἀπαντάω*, e.g. Dem. LIV, 37; Aristophanes plays on the similarity, Birds, 1490 ff.

[38] Od. XIV, 178 (*τις ἀθανάτων*); Trag. Adesp. 296, 455; Jebb on Antig. 622; cf. *βλαψίφρων*, *φρενοβλαβής*, *θεοβλαβής*.

[39] Il. VII, 142; Aesch., P. V. 229; Aristotle quoted by Bowra, p. 88; Trag. Adesp. 540; Aristotle, Diehl, Anth. Lyr. I, p. 100.

[40] See Jebb ad loc.

is nothing in the rest of the poem to indicate deception by the god, since, as we have seen, the strength of the enemy may be naturally contrasted not with guile, but with the strength that is lent by a divine ally. The use of the word βλάπτειν to express the destruction of the defeated demands some remark. It is commonly used as an antithesis to ὠφελεῖν and does not as a rule imply more than injury, so that it can actually be used in contrast to a word denoting complete destruction, as in Thucydides, V, 103: κἂν βλάψῃ, οὐ καθεῖλεν. For this reason it seems to be rare in contexts parallel to ours; I have noted only one example in Epigram (Anth. Pal. VII, 273, 3). Its use here is, however, in keeping with the religious tone of the poem. The word is semi-technical of the malevolent activities of the gods; this sense appears in Plutarch's classification of the gods as βλάπτοντες and ὠφελοῦντες,[41] and it persists in later Greek in the use of βλάπτειν in regard to the evil influence of planets[42] and premonitions of evil in dreams.[43] In Plato[44] it is used of hurting by magical practices. It may be noticed also, as relevant to our argument, that the word is often used of the action of an indeterminate supernatural power.[45] It is true that where the word is thus used of divine agents it often has the meaning of κωλύειν[46] rather than of ἀπολλύναι, but in a context such as ours the two meanings approach each other and the word bears an emphatic sense. It expresses the idea of the balking or thwarting of an enterprise, which in this case is a military expedition that is thwarted by defeat. This primary meaning of βλάπτειν is appropriate to the immediate context. The god comes by a divine path to meet the Athenians in their way and balk them of their goal.[47]

[41] Mor. 880b; cf. Eur., Cycl. 524. Cf. Scholia in Theocr. vet. (Wendel), p. 102 (παρμοί).

[42] Kern, Orph. Fragm., p. 289 (περὶ ἐπεμβ.), ll. 5, 20, 23, 32.

[43] Artemid. Onir. II, 36. The use of βλάπτειν dealt with by Liddell-Scott-Jones, s.v., III, 2, may be related to that in Eur., Hel. 868, where it means to mar or pollute in a ritual sense.

[44] Rep. 364b.

[45] For example, Xen. Symp. 43 (quoted above); Soph., El. 696 (τις θεῶν); Ajax 456 (τις θεῶν).

[46] Cf. note 20 above.

[47] Cf. O. Becker, op. cit., p. 8, n. 6; p. 159, n. 22.

Ll. 5–7. The restoration of these lines is a matter of great difficulty.[48] As a basis for discussion we may take Peek's earlier reading with Maas's *θέσφατον* in line 6:

ἔβλαφσεν· πρόφρον [γὰρ ἠὸ πέφρα]δε δύσμαχον ἄγραν
ἐχθροῖς θερεύσας [θέσφατον ἡ]υμετέροι
σὺν κακοῖ ἐχσετέλεσσε

This reading is accepted by Bowra, who translates: "The oracle which he gave with seeming good will, of a prey hard for foemen to hunt, that oracle he himself fulfilled to your ruin by his pursuit." This is followed by the conclusion: "For all men for ever he made the accomplishment of oracles trustworthy and to be reckoned on." A view of this kind involves a double intervention of the hero, once in the giving of the oracle and again in the battle. Though epiphanies are common enough in literature, it is perhaps a little surprising to find such elaborate supernatural machinery actually at work and recorded in an epitaph no doubt set up immediately after the defeat. We have already expressed the opinion that there was no real epiphany and we must consider whether the language of this section of the poem and of the conclusion lends any support to the other view.

It will be noted that in the word *πρόφρων* itself there is nothing to suggest that the good will is mere seeming.[49] In the second place, Peek's reading as interpreted by Bowra gives an impossibly tortured construction and for stylistic reasons alone may with Reinhardt be rejected. Though the language is oracular, it is impossible to obtain from the aorist participle, situated as it is, the content of a prophecy made to the Athenians. We may conclude then that there is insufficient evidence for the theory that the *ἡμίθεος* had given a misleading response to the Athenians. There is a further difficulty in Bowra's view. The hypothesis of a deceitful oracle given with "seeming good will" rests largely upon the concluding sentence, and it is

[48] The exact length of the lacuna appears to be indeterminable and the only certain point is that there is room for one more letter in line 5 than in line 6. I cannot see in the photograph any trace of the Δ which Peek shows after the lacuna in line 5.

[49] We miss something like the *τὸ πρῶτον* with *φιλόφρων* in Persae 111.

doubtful if this can naturally be taken as Bowra wishes. The word λόγια, which is crucial for the interpretation is found in prose and comedy and is quoted once from Euripides,[50] but seems to be lacking in the other tragedians and in classical poetry in general. Its usage has been clearly defined by Neil on Aristophanes, Knights 120: "The distinction (i.e. between λόγιον and χρησμός) seems to be that λόγια applies to oracular utterances of the gods or seers *preserved and circulated* orally, or more commonly in writing, while χρησμός is the general word." And again: "I know of no case where λόγιον means an oracle just delivered, except perhaps Lucian, Jup. trag. 31." Though this distinction may not be strictly observed in later Greek,[51] classical usage seems to justify us in assuming that λογίων would not naturally suggest a reference to a particular response given immediately before the expedition.

It follows that the basis for assuming a consultation of Orion or any other hero falls to the ground and that we must look for another explanation of the lines under discussion. It is true that the language is appropriate to oracle, but it is possible to consider it either as a reflection of the language of current λόγια or as chosen as metaphorically appropriate to divine action.[52]

[50] Heracl. 405; *delet* Wilamowitz.

[51] Professor Nock suggests a number of passages in Diod. Sic. where λόγιον may be equivalent to χρησμός. For example, IV, 73, 5; V, 54, 4: κατά τι λόγιον (perhaps a Delphic response; cf. V, 59, 4: κατά τινα χρησμόν); VII, 3, 4. The words are used synonymously of a prophecy παραδεδομένον ἐκ προγόνων (II, 26, 9; 27, 2).

[52] Ἄγρη and ἐκθηρεύειν are used metaphorically by Herodotus (IX, 39, 2; 90, 2; VI, 31, 2), but the symbolism is specially appropriate to religious language. Cf. ἀγρεῖ in Agam. 126, used to recall the ἄγρα of the eagles; θηραθεῖσαι in P. V. 1072; θηρῶσιν τὸν ἄσεπτον, Eur., Bacch. 890; θήρευσε, Pindar, Pyth. IV, 90; εὔαγρος in prayer, Soph., O. C. 1089; the symbolism of the net belongs to the same sphere, P. V. 1078; Persae 113. If, as is possible, one particular λόγιον was referred to, it may have been similar in its symbolism to that parodied in Knights 197 ff. (cf. Neil, ad loc.). Δύσμαχος ἄγρα suggests the serpent (Antig. 126, δυσχείρωμα δράκοντος; Aesch., Ch. 246) or a bird of prey attacked by another (Persae, 205 ff.), and θηρεύειν seems to have been technical of the eagle as a bird of omen. Homer twice mentions it as θηρητήρ (Il. XXI, 252; XXIV, 315); cf. perhaps Artemid. Onir. III, 64, 191 and IV, 56. In Xen. Anab. VI, 1, 23, λαμβάνειν τὰ ἐπιτήδεια is equivalent to θηρεύειν. When it was desired to take the omens without waiting for casual observation, pieces of meat seem to have been cast to birds as a kind of symbolic ἄγρα (Paus. IX, 3, 4; Apollod. I, 9, 12). Our poet clearly drew his language from this religious sphere.

The phrase *ὑμετέρῳ σὺν κακῷ* may be felt to favor the theory of a deceptive oracle, but as we shall see, it is compatible with another interpretation of the conclusion. We may, then, look for a simpler restoration of the lines such as that of H. Fraenkel, who, on the analogy of a passage in Hesiod,[53] punctuates after *πρόφρων* and reads as follows:

> *ἔβλαφσεν πρόφρον· [προσένειμε] δὲ δύσμαχον ἄγραν*
> *ἐχθροῖς θερεύσας· [καὶ τὸ μὲν h]υμετέροι*
> *σὺν κακοῖ ἐχσετέλεσσε, βροτοῖσι δὲ πᾶσι τὸ λοιπὸν*
> *φράζεσθαι λογίων πιστὸν ἔθηκε τέλος.*

This restoration is attractive; the aorist *θηρεύσας*, if we take it strictly, means not "having pursued" but "having hunted down" or "having captured" and thus accords well with a verb such as *προσένειμε*. The god hunts down the prey and delivers it to the enemy. Objection has been taken to the use of *πρόφρων* with the meaning "of malice aforethought" on the ground that its common sense in religious language is *propitius*,[54] and it is possible that we should read rather:

> *ἔβλαφσεν· πρόφρον [γὰρ ἔνειμ' hó]δε δύσμαχον ἄγραν*
> *ἐχθροῖς θέρεύσας· κτλ.*

Fraenkel's reading, however, is supported by parallels from Hesiod and Theognis, especially Theognis 403:

> *ὅντινα δαίμων*
> *πρόφρων ἐς μεγάλην ἀμπλακίην παράγει.*

It is a strong argument in its favor that to describe the god as *propitius*, even in relation to the enemy, is unnatural in a poem in which his hostility is the main theme.[55]

[53] Op. 665; cf. Wilamowitz ad loc.

[54] *Πρόφρων* is common in prayer, Soph., El. 1380 (*γενοῦ πρόφρων ἡμῖν ἀρωγός*); Aristoph., Birds 930; Ariphron, Diehl II, p. 130. It is correspondingly appropriate of a friendly epiphany, as in Apoll. Rhod. IV, 919.

[55] Other restorations are possible, but in default of anything more convincing I take Fraenkel's reading as an approximation to the original. Reinhardt's *τοισίδε* is awkward. Apart from Peek's *πέφραδε*, which we have rejected, the only verb which readily suggests itself is *ἴδε*; it might be possible to read *πρόφρων γὰρ ὅπως ἴδε* (that is, "when he saw that the prey was too difficult for the enemy to

Ll. 6–8. The last sentence of the poem draws a moralizing conclusion couched in language drawn once more from religious terminology. If we take Fraenkel's text, the connection of thought is not so much that the Athenians have acted so as to bring about their own destruction, though that notion is involved, but rather that their loss is the profit of mankind; the gods make their power manifest by exemplary punishment of those who ignore their laws. That this idea is present in our passage may be shown by consideration of the language. Ἔθηκε[56] is appropriate of the establishment of divine law; τὸ λοιπόν[57] conveys a note of warning; βροτοῖσι πᾶσι is a recurrent phrase where the manifestation of divine power is in question.[58] A few instances will make this clear.

(*a*) Soph., O. T. 902. Worship will cease, if oracles are not fulfilled:

εἰ μὴ τάδε χειρόδεικτα
πᾶσιν ἁρμόσει βροτοῖς.

(*b*) Weinreich, Ant. Heilungswunder., p. 106 (Soarchus inscription, l. 4):

πᾶσιν θαῦμα βροτοῖσι μέγα.

(*c*) Weinreich, op. cit., p. 92, Philostr. Γυμν. 41 (II, p. 283, Kayser):

θεοῦ δοκείτω μᾶλλον ἐνδεικνυμένου τι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μέγα.

This manifestation of power is specially prominent in regard to punishment; divine like human punishment must be exemplary.

(*d*) Herodotus II, 120, 5:

τοῦ δαιμονίου παρασκευάζοντος ὅκως πανωλεθρίῃ ἀπολόμενοι καταφανὲς τοῦτο τοῖσι ἀνθρώποισι ποιήσωσι, ὡς τῶν μεγάλων ἀδικημάτων μεγάλαι εἰσὶ καὶ αἱ τιμωρίαι παρὰ τῶν θεῶν.

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take"), if a suitable object could be found for ἐξετέλεσσε. The general interpretation of the poem proposed in this paper does not depend on any particular restoration of these lines.

[56] Cf. Agam. 178 (θέντα).

[57] Cf., for example, Hdt. I, 159, 3; 11, 2; 189, 2; VII, 237, 3; VIII, 143, 2.

[58] For secularized use in verse see Philiscus (Diehl I, p. 97, l. 7) and I.G. II, 2, 1078 (public notice).

(*e*) Diod. Sic. XXXIV, 9:

τὸ γὰρ δαιμόνιον ὥσπερ ἐπίτηδες εἰς παραδειγματισμὸν τοῖς ἄλλοις τοὺς ἀπονενοημένους περιεῖδεν ἀβοηθήτους.

(*f*) Plut., de stoic. repugn. 15, 2:

ταῦτά φησι τοὺς θεοὺς ποιεῖν, ὅπως τῶν πονηρῶν κολαζομένων οἱ λοιποὶ παραδείγμασι τούτοις χρώμενοι ἧττον ἐπιχειρῶσι τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν.

This conception of punishment as a public example appears also naturally where the punishment is followed by confession; publicity in this case is a powerful advertisement [59] for the *δύναμις* of the god.

(*g*) Pindar, Pyth. II, 21:

θεῶν δ' ἐφετμαῖς Ἰξίονα φαντὶ ταῦτα βροτοῖς λέγειν.

This formula persists later in the confession inscriptions; for example, Steinleitner, Die Beicht, p. 113: *παραγγέλλω πᾶσι μὴ καταφρονεῖν τοῦ θεοῦ.* We may perhaps add here a passage from Aristophanes which in any case illustrates the *πᾶσι βροτοῖς* topic, though its bearing on confession is not certain.

(*h*) Aristophanes, Thes. 667 ff.:

ἢν γάρ με λάθῃ δράσας ἀνόσια,
δώσει τε δίκην καὶ πρὸς τούτῳ
τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνδράσιν ἔσται
παράδειγμ' ὕβρεως ἀδίκων τ' ἔργων
ἀθέων τε τρόπων·
φήσει δ' εἶναί τε θεοὺς φανερῶς,
δείξει τ' ἤδη
πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις σεβίζειν δαίμονας.

682. *εἴ τι δρῴη*
πᾶσιν ἐμφανὴς ὁρᾶν ἔσ-
ται γυναιξὶ καὶ βροτοῖσι
ὅτι τὰ παράνομα τά τ' ἀνόσια θεὸς
παραχρῆμ' ἀποτίνεται.

[59] Ovid, Ex Ponto I, 1, 55:

talia caelestes fieri praeconia gaudent
ut sua quid valeant numina teste probent.

If we could take the words *φήσει δ' εἶναί τε θεοὺς φανερῶς* as implying the idea of public acknowledgment of sin, this passage would be of some importance for the history of confession, since evidence for the practice is scanty in the classical period.[60]

It is impossible in the space of this article to follow the topic further, but it may be noted that variations of our formula are common in religious propaganda, for example in the Oracula Sibyllina.[61] The implication of the universal validity of religious truth is perhaps worth noting. In Biblical and Christian Greek *πάντα τὰ ἔθνη* has a similar force.[62]

We may conclude then that the sense of our passage is that the god by his action has made a manifest example of the Athenians and so established for mankind the validity of the truth laid down in the last line of the poem. This conclusion may be confirmed by consideration of a further element in the language. The phrase *πᾶσι βροτοῖς*, as we have seen, belongs to the sphere of miracle and divine punishment; the two are not distinct, since punishment by god is a form of miracle. It is not surprising, therefore, to find further traces of the conventional terminology. As the topic is one of some interest in itself as well as in relation to the interpretation of this poem, a somewhat lengthy discussion may be excused.

The word *ἄελπτον* occurs early in miracle description in the famous passage of Archilochus which describes the eclipse of the sun (Diehl, 74). The argument of the poem is, it will be remembered, that such a manifestation of power shows that nothing is impossible to the gods:

> *ἐκ δὲ τοῦ καὶ πιστὰ πάντα κἀπίελπτα γίγνεται*
> *ἀνδράσιν.*

[60] As far as I have noted, Pettazoni, La confessione dei peccati, does not treat the passage.

[61] III, 6 (*ἀγγέλλειν πᾶσιν*); 298 (*κατὰ πᾶσαν γαῖαν*); 811 (*πᾶσι θνητοῖς*); IV, 19; VIII, 3 (*πᾶσι ἀνθρώποις*). Similarly in the morality of fable, Babrius 22, 96.

[62] The connection of this phraseology with the missionary idea is noted by Pfister, op. cit., p. 346 (cf. 150, 212); cf. G. Björck, Der Fluch des Christen Sabinus, pp. 65 f. The element of publicity and propaganda is a regular element in miracle report; see for example the references to the presence of the 'congregation' in the miracle records of the Tiber island, S.I.G. III, 1173 (*δημοσίᾳ* etc.). Cf. Kerényi, Die Griechisch-Orientalische Roman literatur, pp. 9 f. with notes 39 to 42.

The word πιστά is relevant to our passage; human disbelief in divine power is confuted by miracle. The end of the poem belongs to the same sphere of thought; the gods are capable of performing what to man is ἀδύνατον. This passage of Archilochus was imitated by later authors,[63] but a consideration of later miracle literature shows that we have to do not merely with a literary tradition, but with a pattern of ideas from the realm of real religious belief. With certain variations of language the same thought is reflected, for example, in Sophocles, Electra 1315 ff.:

εἴργασαι δέ μ' ἄσκοπα
ὥστ' εἰ πατήρ μοι ζῶν ἵκοιτο μηκέτ' ἂν
τέρας νομίζειν αὐτό, πιστεύειν δ' ὁρᾶν.

Kaibel recognizes the terminology of miracle and refers to line 1262:

ἐπεί σε νῦν ἀφράστως
ἀέλπτως τ' ἐσεῖδον.

Here again we find the idea of the accomplishment of what is ἄελπτον (ἄσκοπα) as confirming belief (πιστεύειν) even in what seems ἀδύνατον. The same terminology appears again in Euripides (I. A. 1585):

ἄελπτον εἰσιδόντες ἐκ θεῶν τινος
φάσμ', οὗ γε μήδ' ὀρωμένου πίστις παρῆν.

It will be clear from these examples that ἀέλπτως and πιστόν in our inscription belong to the language of religious thought. The pious man is he who is convinced by performance of the possibility of what seems ἄελπτον; to use later language he has both πίστις and ἐλπίς.[64]

[63] O. Becker, op. cit., p. 205, n. 23, cites Soph., Ajax 648; Antig. 388; Eur., fragm. 761. Add perhaps Eur., Ion 1510. I am unable to consult Ernest Dutoit, Le Thème de l'Adynaton dans la poésie antique. The power to perform what is ἀδύνατον is an attribute of the gods. Thus the Meter Leto ἐξ ἀδυνάτων δυνατὰ πυεῖ (Steinleitner, op. cit., p. 59). It should be noted that this typical antithetical form of expression is reflected in the contrast between ἄελπτον and ἐπίελπτα in Archilochus. See this journal, vol. XXXII (1939), p. 8, with notes 40 and 41; add also Cleanthes (Powell, Coll. Alex. p. 227, l. 18) and Aristophanes, Lys. 772 (τὰ δ' ὑπέρτερα νέρτερα θήσει Ζεὺς ὑψιβρεμέτης).

[64] Kerényi, op. cit., p. 63, n. 76 (cf. p. 104, n. 39).

That we are dealing with a living religious conception and not merely with literary form seems clear from later developments. It has already been observed that in prose παράδοξος takes the place of ἄελπτος; the equivalence is illustrated indirectly in Lucian, Λούκιος 54: τῇ δὲ παραδόξῳ ταύτῃ καὶ μηδέποτε ἐλπισθείσῃ θέᾳ πάντες ἐκπεπληγμένοι δεινὸν ἐπεθορύβησαν. It is needless to illustrate the terminology fully;[65] in addition to παράδοξον, ἀδύνατον, ἄπιστον, ἀπίθανον, θαυμάσιον and ἀνέλπιστον are commonly used of the miraculous. These words in a way express that natural sceptical strain[66] in man which the propaganda of religion strives to overcome by confirming belief, that is by making what seems ἄπιστον appear πιστόν, or, to use language from a different field,[67] by turning *fabula* into *historia*. Faith and miracle are thus, in this sphere of pagan thought, indissolubly connected. So the inscriptions of Epidaurus[68] record the conversion of the scoffer who remains to pray: θεωρῶν δὲ τοὺς ἐν τῷ ἰαρῷ πίνακας ἀπίστει τοῖς ἰάμασιν. Miracle confounds disbelief and the god confers a new name on the doubting Thomas to commemorate the event: ὅτι τοίνυν ἔμπροσθεν ἀπίστεις αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἐοῦσιν ἀπίστοις, τὸ λοιπὸν ἔστω τοι Ἄπιστος ὄνομα. This struggle against scepticism is a characteristic feature of later religious development. Iamblichus (V. P. 138) describes the 'Pythagoreans' as οὐδὲν ἀπιστοῦντες ὅ τι ἂν εἰς τὸ θεῖον ἀνάγηται, and he goes on to give a statement of the standpoint of the faithful (139): ὥστε πρὸς πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐχὶ αὐτοὺς εὐήθεις νομίζουσιν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀπιστοῦντας· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι τὰ μὲν δυνατὰ τοῖς θεοῖς, τὰ δὲ ἀδύνατα, ὥσπερ οἴεσθαι τοὺς σοφιζομένους, ἀλλὰ πάντα δυνατά. καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἡ αὐτή ἐστι τῶν ἐπῶν, ἃ ἐκεῖνοί φασι μεν εἶναι τοῦ Λίνου, ἔστι

[65] See, for example, Isocr. πρὸς Νικ. 23a (παράδοξον, ἄπιστον); Plut., Camillus 3 (ἀπίστων θαυμάτων); Palaephatus (Festa), p. 2 (ἀπιστότερον, θαυμασιώτερον); p. 11 (ἄπιστος, ἀδύνατος); p. 63 (ἀπίθανον); Pseudo-Eratosthenes, Catasterismi (Olivieri), pp. 22, 34 (ἀπίθανον). On παράδοξον see Weinreich, op. cit., pp. 198 f. and Kerényi, op. cit., p. 12, n. 55 and p. 18, n. 93. For miracle literature in general, see Nock, Conversion, pp. 90 f. and p. 287.

[66] Reflected in literature of the ἰαμβικὴ ἰδέα in the ψόγος of seers and prophets; see F. J. Brecht, Motiv- und Typengesch. des gr. Spottepigr. (Philol. Suppl. XXII, 2), pp. 41 ff.

[67] Kerényi, op. cit., p. 2.

[68] I. G. IV, 951, 23 ff.; cf. 951, 34: τῶν ἰαμάτων διεγέλα, ὡς ἀπίθανα καὶ ἀδύνατα ἐόντα χωλοὺς καὶ τυφλοὺς ὑγιεῖς γίνεσθαι ἐνύπνιον ἰδόντας μόνον.

μέντοι ἴσως ἐκείνων· ἔλπεσθαι χρὴ πάντ', ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔστ' οὐδὲν ἄελπτον. Similar language is used of the sceptic in Lucian, Philopseudes 3: ἀσεβὴς οὗτός γε καὶ ἀνόητος αὐτοῖς ἔδοξεν οὕτω προδήλοις καὶ ἀληθέσι πράγμασιν ἀπιστῶν. The great weapon of this faith is manifest miracle; as the gospel of John has it (11, 45): θεασάμενοι ὃ ἐποίησεν, ἐπίστευσαν εἰς αὐτόν. Similarly in Iamblichus (V. P. 17) the sailors are convinced (ἐπείσθησαν) by miracle of the presence of a god.

It should be clear from what has been said that we are dealing with a complex of ideas which can be traced in literature from Archilochus down to Christian times, the conception namely that the gods can and do in fact perform what is παράδοξον or even ἀδύνατον, and by manifest performance make πιστόν what is ἄπιστον and so confirm the faith of man. It is not going too far to see the reflection of this religious idea and of its conventional form in our poem; it is hardly accidental that we have ἀέλπ[τως], ἐξετέλεσσε, πᾶσι βροτοῖς and πιστόν in the short space of eight lines.

What is the sense of the conclusion? The Athenians, I take it, have not been arbitrarily destroyed by a god who has himself wilfully deceived them. Such circumstances would favor a conclusion on the futility of μαντική rather than one on the trustworthiness of oracles. If our argument has been right, the Athenians were punished, their punishment was a warning, and the offence for which they were punished was not a failure in exegesis, but that scepticism which more than most offences is unpleasing to the gods. They acted on the impious and pessimistic principle to which Pindar gives expression (Ol. XII, 8):

> σύμβολον δ' οὔ πώ τις ἐπιχθονίων
> πιστὸν ἀμφὶ πράξιος ἐσσομένας εὗρεν θεόθεν·
> τῶν δὲ μελλόντων τετύφλωνται φραδαί.

This lack of faith leads to their destruction and by a manifest display of power heaven shows that man must take to heart (φράζεσθαι[69]) the warning that the fulfilment of divine prophecy is sure. Our poem then is a religious interpretation of events

[69] Φράζεσθαι is in keeping with the style; see Hendess, Oracula Graeca, 64, 69b, 108, 131.

precisely like that in Herodotus VIII, 20: παραχρησάμενοι τὸν Βάκιδος χρησμὸν ὡς οὐδὲν λέγοντα . . . περιπετέα ἐποιήσαντο σφίσι αὐτοῖσι τὰ πρήγματα. The action involves a peripety, not because the god has deceived, but because miraculous divine intervention comes ἀέλπτως to confound those who have ignored the warning of prophecy.

Before we pass to more general consideration of the poem, it will be convenient to summarize the conclusions which have so far been reached. We must assume, if our argument is sound, that the Athenian expedition set out in defiance of one or more current λόγια. It met with defeat and the defeat was attributed, by public opinion or by the poet alone, to supernatural intervention. Scepticism is thus punished and the Athenian disaster is a warning to mankind. Cleverly combined with this main structural idea is the topic of consolation that the dead would have been a match for their foes on equal terms. We thus reject in its entirety the hypothesis of ambiguous response and real epiphany. On our view the poem is a *post eventum* religious interpretation of the defeat, based on a framework of ideas which we have shown to be familiar and couched in language which reflects unmistakably a conventional religious terminology.

It would carry us beyond the scope of this paper to discuss at length all the religious and literary questions which have been suggested by our detailed discussion, but some points of general interest may be indicated briefly. Compared with the best fifth century epigram our poem strikes the reader as in a way unclassical; to use the simple and noble fact of death in battle for one's country as a text for a religious gloss is not the manner of Simonides. Our poet has drawn his inspiration from a different sphere of Greek thought, one which had its basis in popular belief and which appears in literature on the one hand in a writer like Herodotus who reflects ordinary religious opinion and on the other in writers such as Pindar and the tragedians who give a poetical expression to the same ideas.

The choice of this manner may have been motivated by the circumstances in which the poem came to be written; in any case the result has been to produce a work which is hardly lapidary in style. It has, however, a certain unity of structure which arises from the use of a form familiar in Greek literature, the form of narrative as illustrative of general principle.[70] Two examples will suffice to illustrate the point. Firstly one from Pindar (Pyth. IV, 90):

> καὶ μὰν Τιτυὸν βέλος Ἀρτέμιδος θήρευσε κραιπνόν,
> ἐξ ἀνικάτου φαρέτρας ὀρνύμενον,
> ὄφρα τις τᾶν ἐν δυνατῷ φιλοτά-
> των ἐπιψαύειν ἔραται.

The same use of the mythological example as a basis for general truth plays a structural part in Sappho's poem on the absent Anaktoria. Starting with the priamel leading up to the general statement that the fairest thing on earth is the thing one loves the best, she goes on to illustrate her point by the story of Helen. The principle in our poem is the same, though the example is a real and not a mythological one. That the general truth comes emphatically last as a clausula conforms to the stylistic use of the γνώμη elsewhere.

In regard to the matter, the first result of our inquiry was to classify the poem as an example of religious interpretation. In this respect the epigram illustrates a deep-rooted tendency of religious thought which becomes dominant in later antiquity, the tendency to regard all nature and history as a source of examples of moral qualities or illustrations of divine providence.[71] As Professor Nock [72] puts it: "Life, like myth, has its allegorical meaning. As myth when interpreted comes down into the sphere of ordinary things, so life when interpreted rises into that sphere." Perhaps the most striking example of such

[70] Dornseiff, Literarische Verwendungen des Beispiels, Vorträge der Bibl. Warburg, 1924–1925, pp. 206 ff. Nock, Conversion, p. 233.

[71] Dornseiff, op. cit., has treated this topic in an illuminating fashion in relation both to literary form and to the history of ideas. For the πρόνοια literature see Weinreich, op. cit., pp. 133 ff.; cf. the collocation of παράδοξον and πρόνοια in Diod. Sic. XVII, 103.

[72] Op. cit., p. 233.

interpretation in ancient literature is the famous passage in the second book of the Aeneid where (to quote Professor Nock again) "Venus lifts from the eyes of Aeneas all that dims mortal sight and shows him the divinities who are active in the fall of Troy." This way of looking at life is fundamentally at variance with the humanism of Homer (divine machinery notwithstanding) and is foreign also to the best Greek epigram and to the historical thought of Thucydides. It is this contrast which may make a reader feel on first consideration that the poem is alien in spirit from the period to which it must on epigraphical grounds be assigned. It has been the object of this paper to show that any such impression is erroneous; the evidence which has been produced will show that in its ideas there is nothing that cannot be paralleled in earlier or contemporary writers who reflect the general religious thought of the Greeks. It may be added that this religious interpretation of events is to be seen also in classical art. Webster [73] has put the matter clearly in relation to the metopes of the Parthenon: "On the North side the metopes are filled with scenes from the Trojan war, enacted under the eyes of the gods, so that the Greek victory like their later victory in the Persian wars should be ascribed to the gods." And again: "The twenty-nine metopes depicting the sack of Troy, held together by the echoing figures of Helios and Selene at beginning and end, are balanced by three metopes of watching gods and goddesses, who give the divine fiat to the proceedings." Before we leave this topic, it may be remarked that an understanding of this religious category is of importance not only for a study of ancient thought, but also for a proper appreciation of the difference between the popular and the scientific view of life in the present day. The ancient mode of thought transmitted by religious tradition still influences the outlook of the ordinary man.

The specific pattern of religious interpretation employed here is that of neglected oracle, miraculous punishment of scepticism, fulfilment of oracle and inculcation of faith. That belief in oracles is one of the props of religion is a familiar theme in tragedy and it is noteworthy that three of the plays of

[73] Greek Art and Literature, pp. 97 f.; pp. 121 f.

Sophocles are concerned with the accomplishment of prophecy.[74] This is a matter of some literary as well as religious interest. The oracle theme gives to the events of a drama not only a framework of beginning and end but also, in the way we have indicated, a religious meaning and importance[75] which they might not otherwise be felt to possess. It is true that such a framework does not dispense with the necessity for *τὸ εἰκός* and *τὸ ἀναγκαῖον* in the development of the theme, but it is not a superficial bond of unity imposed on intractable material. For the ordinary spectator the religious interpretation of events was not a literary device, but an important element in his conception of the way in which they really happened.[76]

We may from this point of view approach the question of the *deux ex machina*. It will be clear from what has already been said that divine intervention is not by any means a merely artificial method of solving a problem for which the dramatist has no solution; in popular belief the power to act so is an essential attribute of the gods and they do so act among men. Euripides five times[77] expresses this idea in the well known lines:

πολλαὶ μορφαὶ τῶν δαιμονίων
πολλὰ δ' ἀέλπτως κραίνουσι θεοί·
καὶ τὰ δοκηθέντ' οὐκ ἐτελέσθη,
τῶν δ' ἀδοκήτων πόρον ηὗρε θεός.
τοιόνδ' ἀπέβη τόδε πρᾶγμα.

[74] Webster, op. cit., pp. 127 and 148.

[75] Cf. on this aspect, Heliodorus IX, 24 (Kerényi, op. cit., p. 21): *τὰ μεγάλα τῶν πραγμάτων μεγάλων δεῖται κατασκευῶν.*

[76] Cf. Eur., fragm. 62:

Ἑκάβη, τὸ θεῖον ὡς ἄελπτον ἔρχεται
θνητοῖσιν.

For the popular view note the significant passage in Aristophanes, Wasps 733:

σοὶ δὲ νῦν τις θεῶν παρὼν ἐμφανὴς
ξυλλαμβάνει τοῦ πράγματος.

There is, of course, no question of a real epiphany. See too the almost proverbial phrase in Wasps 799 : *ὅρα τὸ χρῆμα· τὰ λόγια ὡς περαίνεται.* The belief is reflected in the use of this motive in folk-tale (Rose, Handbook of Greek Mythology, p. 294).

[77] At the end of Alcestis, Andromache, Bacchae, Helena, Medea (varied). This passage and that which follows are brought into relation by E. Mueller, De Graecorum Deorum partibus tragicis, R. V. V., 1910, p. 124.

That the ancient critics recognized the real religious basis of the use of supernatural intervention appears from an important passage [78] which, since it illustrates the terminology, may be quoted at length:

Θεὸν ἀπὸ μηχανῆς· ἐπὶ τῶν θεάτρων, ἥνικά τι παράδοξον ἐπιτελεῖσθαι ἔδει καὶ πλέον πίστεως, ἄνωθεν ὑπὲρ τὰς παρ' ἑκάτερα τῆς μέσης τοῦ θεάτρου θύρας . . . μηχανῶν δύο μετεωριζομένων ἡ ἐξ ἀριστερῶν θεοὺς καὶ ἥρωας ἐνεφάνιζε παρευθὺς ὥσπερ λύσιν φέροντας τῶν ἀμηχάνων. καὶ τούτου παραδηλουμένου, ὡς οὐ χρὴ ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς ὁρωμένοις, ἐπεὶ θεὸς πάρεστι τῷ ἔργῳ, ᾧ μηδὲν ἀδύνατον ἐκτελεῖν.

Here once more we have the conception of the fulfilment (ἐκτελεῖν) of the παράδοξον or the ἀδύνατον by the gods as carrying conviction and as confirming the faith of men (οὐ χρὴ ἀπιστεῖν). The thought is that briefly expressed by Pindar (Ol. X, 49):

ἐμοὶ δὲ θαυμάσαι
θεῶν τελεσάντων οὐδέν ποτε φαίνεται
ἔμμεν ἄπιστον.

The divine intervention may be used not only to conclude an action, but to set it in train. From this point of view our poem recalls the topic of the *numen offensum* [79] which occurs in the Odyssey and persists later to become prominent in Romance. In Romance, of course, the series of peripeties which result ends not in disaster, but in final reconciliation. The analogy of real life in this case is confession and expiation of the offence after punishment. We may recall the words of Nicias[80] in Sicily: εἴ τῳ θεῶν ἐπίφθονοι ἐστρατεύσαμεν ἀποχρώντως ἤδη τετιμωρήμεθα.

There is a further point which links our discussion with tragedy. We have seen that our poem may be regarded as a record of punishment miracle; its tragic equivalent [81] is the theme of *hybris*, *ate*, "and enlightenment, whether of the sinner himself or of the world through his example." In this tragic

[78] Schol. in Luc., ed. H. Rabe (Lipsiae, 1906), p. 164, 2 ff.
[79] Apul. XI, 2; Kerényi, op. cit., p. 23, n. 112.
[80] Thuc., VII, 77, 3.
[81] Webster, op. cit., pp. 53 f.

theme supernatural intervention is a constant element. It will be remembered that in discussing the elements of pity and fear which are necessary to tragic action Aristotle (1452a 1 ff.) notes that they are found above all in events which take place παρὰ δόξαν δι' ἄλληλα. Such events are specially θαυμαστά, for "even matters of chance seem most marvellous if there is an appearance of design as it were (ὥσπερ ἐπίτηδες, cf. Diod. Sic. XXXIV, 9, above) in them; as for instance the statue of Mitys at Argos killed the author of Mitys' death by falling down on him." Two points in this account deserve remark. Aristotle, with his usual desire to find psychological grounds, sees in the 'paradoxical' a source of wonder and in that a cause of pleasure (Rhet. 1371b 10). Secondly he indicates by implication the tendency to see design in events that in philosophic eyes occur by chance. In his treatment there is reflected, perhaps, a rational theory of the miraculous. For him the 'paradoxical' is the psychological basis of belief in miracle; for religious belief certain events occur παρὰ δόξαν because it is the way of gods to act so. For our purpose the striking and important feature is that Aristotle, when he wishes to illustrate a tragic sequence, takes his example not from Tragedy but from a miracle report of common type. It is true that in his general theory he does insist on the necessity for inner unity of action, but he does also, it will be remembered, admit an irrational or 'miraculous' element (1451b 16) and in doing so he uses language that recalls the terminology that we found in the religious sphere: αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι πιθανόν ἐστι τὸ δυνατόν· τὰ μὲν οὖν μὴ γενόμενα οὔπω πιστεύομεν εἶναι δυνατά, τὰ δὲ γενόμενα φανερὸν ὅτι δυνατά· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐγένετο εἰ ἦν ἀδύνατα. The position here is similar to that which we discussed in connection with the *deus ex machina*. For religious belief miracle is part of the pattern of thought by which human affairs are interpreted. The religious attitude to miracle is of importance not merely as giving ground for its use in a tragic action, but also in relation to the question of tragic emotion. The intervention of the supernatural is sudden and gives rise not only to wonder, but to fear; Aristotle uses the story of Mitys because the event is φοβερόν.[82] Hence it comes

[82] Kerényi, op. cit., p. 5, n. 23.

that in the description of supernatural events we find a terminology similar to that of Aristotle in his discussion of tragedy. So in Lucian, Philopseudes 37: *ὑπερβάλλεσθε τὰς παραδόξους ταύτας καὶ φοβερὰς διηγήσεις*, and again in a passage already quoted (Λούκιος 54): *τῇ δὲ παραδόξῳ ταύτῃ καὶ μηδέποτε ἐλπισθείσῃ θέᾳ πάντες ἐκπεπληγμένοι δεινὸν ἐπεθορύβησαν*. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the importance attached to fear in Aristotle's theory is derived from this religious sphere; whether his theory is a sound one we need hardly inquire here. We have evidence of the effect of *τὸ τερατῶδες* on Athenian audiences in the fifth century[83] and later popular literature, pagan and Christian, shows the permanent appeal of the supernatural.[84]

If, then, we apply the tragic analogy to our poem, we may see in the Athenian defeat a *πάθος* which comes *ἀέλπτως* and is thus *θαυμαστόν* and *ἐκπληκτικόν*; the event is a *περιπέτεια* and the Athenians are *τλήμονες* because they have suffered a *μετάβασις εἰς ἀτυχίαν* which, since they acquitted themselves like *ἐπιεικεῖς*, arouses *ἔλεος* in their compatriots. Such a peripety for the religious mind must have happened by supernatural design (*ὥσπερ ἐπίτηδες*) and so acquires the dignity of relation to the gods. A cause is found in a *ἁμαρτία*, the neglect of divine prophecy. Our poem thus offers in miniature a sequence of events of the kind which appeared to the Greeks as tragic.

It has been the object of this general discussion partly to show the influence of religious beliefs on certain literary forms and theories and partly to enforce once more the point that in its content our poem contains nothing that cannot be explained by reference to the common religious thought of the Greeks. There is not need to look for an explanation of its theme any more than of its language and form in any unverifiable hypothesis of Peloponnesian influence.[85] In our view the poem is Attic

[83] Vita Aesch. 9.

[84] In 'ecplectic' effect the supernatural has yielded place in comparatively recent times to crime.

[85] This is not the place to enter upon a discussion of the obscure topic of Peloponnesian lament (Page, Greek Poetry and Life, pp. 206–217; Bowra, p. 86). I do not attach any importance to mention of defeat as a significant element in the poem. The direct address, on which Bowra lays some stress, is appropriate to

and reflects that basic religiosity which, though in the fifth century it is somewhat obscured in our eyes by the scepticism of the sophists and the rationalism of Thucydides, appears clearly enough, on the one hand in Herodotus and the tragedians and on the other in the trials for ἀσέβεια, the oracle-mongering of the χρησμολόγοι and the superstitious panic over the affair of the Hermae.

What does require explanation is the application of religious language, matter and form to the epigram and the solution of that problem may be sought in the special circumstances of composition. Though little more than conjecture is possible, the poem may perhaps be brought into relation to historical events. In our view it implies a certain censure on those responsible for the disastrous expedition and, as Professor Nock has suggested, this may be regarded as related to the fact that Pericles actively opposed the invasion of Boeotia by Tolmides. The use of religious propaganda is familiar in the politics of the fifth century and λόγια may have been produced on both sides before the Coronea campaign. The nature of the λόγιον (or λόγια) referred to here cannot be exactly determined, but it may well have been one which prophesied disaster to any enemy attacking a particular territory, or which prophesied success subject to some unfulfilled condition.[86] It is equally impossible

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epitaph; it occurs in Homer in the three laments for Hector (Il. XXIV, 725, 748, 762) and persists into modern Greek (Passow, Popularia Carmina, pp. 257 ff.). It occurs early in epitaph (Schwyzer, op. cit., 165) and in three Simonidean epigrams (Diehl, 79, 101, 117; cf. Wilhelm, Öst. Jahresh. II, 1899, p. 225). Other influences may have been at work in furthering its use; for example, the style of the hymn (H. Meyer, Hymn. Stilel. in d. frühgr. Dicht., pp. 69 ff.; he notes it at the beginning of the Καθαρμοί of Empedocles) and the method of varying narrative and increasing emotional effect by direct address in lyric. It may be noted that the Skolia offer some parallels in this feature and others to our poem. They deal on occasion with defeat and death and have the elements of direct address (Diehl, 11, 13, 15, 24), short narrative (5, 12, 24) and γνώμη (7, 9, 14, 20 φράζευ, 25, 29, 32 ff.). For the formal connection of narrative and γνώμη in this branch of literature, see E. Wüst, Philologus 77, 1921, pp. 36 f.

[86] To illustrate the situation which we assume, reference may be made to the accounts of the disaster of Drabescus. The Athenians were massacred by the Edonoi (ἀνέλπιστοι ἐπιθέμενοι) and according to the tradition in Pausanias (I, 29, 4) there was a supernatural intervention in the battle: Λέγεται δὲ καὶ ὡς κερανnοὶ πέσοιεν ἐπ' αὐτούς. The victims were the first to receive a public tomb κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν

to determine the authorship and the authority which sanctioned the appearance of the epigram on a public monument, but it is tempting to conjecture that Pericles himself had a hand in its choice. God had confirmed his forebodings and justified his policy, and the event entitled him to read a lesson to his opponents. The implied censure combined with the tribute to the bravery of the dead is admirably in keeping with the circumstances. Our analysis of the poem may thus be said to lend some support to the view, which Peek reached on epigraphic grounds, that it commemorates the men who fell at Coronea. It is hardly necessary to add, in view of the evidence which has been produced, that there is nothing which points to an aristocratic or Laconizing [87] milieu as the source of the epigram.

We may conclude by resuming the results of our inquiry. The poem starts with a couplet which is in keeping with the style of epigram and at the same time gives a hint of what is to follow. The transition is made by the use of the consolatory topic of the defeat of better men by divine intervention. The intervention is described in the convention of epiphany and motivated by religious interpretation as a consequence of neglect of divine prophecy. In form it thus belongs to the type of miraculous punishment and, in conformity to type, the punishment is conceived as a manifest warning to man. From another

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τὴν εἰς Ἀκαδημίαν. From the scholia to Aeschines, de F. L. 34, we learn further of a belief that the Athenians were doomed to suffer disaster nine times at Ennea Hodoi by the curse of Phyllis, the deserted lover of the Athenian Demophon. It is possible that these traditions go back to a contemporary source and that the curse of Phyllis was represented by λόγια foretelling disaster to expeditions to Thrace. There is no need, of course, to resort to the hypothesis of a later commemoration in our text of men who had fallen earlier in Thrace; the motive, as we have seen is a recurrent one. Professor Nock adds a reference to Soph., O. C. 92; according to tradition Attica was protected by the grave of Oedipus (Jebb, pp. xxviii f.).

[87] Though religious propaganda was no doubt employed by all parties, a case might be made out for maintaining that it was directed rather to the lower classes. Radermacher (Euripides und die Mantik, Rh. Mus. 53, 1898, pp. 497 ff.) has argued (p. 504) that in the Peloponnesian war it was used by the democrats more than by their opponents. See also R. Staehelin, Das Motiv der Mantik im antiken Drama, R. V. V. XII, 1912–1913, pp. 1 ff.

point of view the sequence of events may be regarded as a tragic peripety brought about by the error of the Athenians themselves. The whole is well-knit together by the structural use of the form of narrative as an enforcement of the general principle which comes emphatically at the close. The unity is strengthened by the uniform religious color of the language; the note is struck in the first line by ἀέλπτως and the theme is developed in appropriate language down to the end, where the answering word πιστόν carries the weight of the conclusion. The poem is not one of exceptional merit, but it will be admitted that the writer has made good use both of religious language and of the forms of religious thought. We concluded further that, while the text could not be regarded as a record of real epiphany, it retains some religious importance as a classical example of religious interpretation. Lastly, we suggested that it might be regarded as a historical document reflecting Periclean policy.

Enough has been said to show the interest of this remarkable epigram as a religious, literary and historical document of the Periclean age. Conclusions on the historical side must be tentative, but, if it is rightly connected with the defeat of Coronea, we may not be wrong in seeing in it the influence of Pericles himself.

Translation

Unhappy ye, who bore to an end unhoped for such a fray and by heaven's will lost your lives in war — not by the foeman's might, some hero coming by a path divine stood in your way and in malice balked you. He took you in the chase and delivered you to your foes, a prey that they alone had hardly won. Thus he brought his will to pass and by the warning of your hurt established for all men to take to heart in time to come the law that the fulfilment of prophecy demands their faith.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF INCARNATION

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My design in these pages is to discuss, not *the* Incarnation, but the philosophy of incarnation as such, the word "incarnation" being interpreted very widely. What is commonly called *the* Incarnation in Christendom, at any rate when interpreted in the common way, is the birth and life of Christ more than 1900 years ago, that is to say a historical occasion, supposed to be unique in kind, in which one of the persons in the Godhead, although always God, actually became a man. To those who take their stand upon this historical fact (as they deem it) I have nothing to say. I cannot see that philosophers are compelled to accept such a datum, and I am not specially interested in the question whether, accepting it, they could accommodate it to their philosophical theology. Anything that is said about incarnation in general will presumably have a certain bearing, direct or indirect, upon *the* Incarnation and upon any problems that may remain when *that* is accepted as a datum; but I shall not try to draw the moral if there is one. What I want to discuss is whether there is any sense of "incarnation" in which incarnation is, metaphysically speaking, necessary, probable or plausible. Would a theologian who had never heard of Palestinian history incline from the natural (or inevitable) trend of his closer reflection upon deity towards the opinion (or constraining inference) that there must be some sort of incarnation of the Godhead? That seems to me to be a general philosophical problem of some interest to philosophical theologians. In any case it is the problem that I want to discuss here.

In a wide way, it might be held that we have an analogue of the problem, if not the very problem itself, when we come to grips with the philosophy of mind and body. That would arise if it were held that every mind *must* be embodied, that its embodiment is an implication of its mentality as such. So many

different meanings, however, may be read into statements of that order that a closer inspection is invited.

I do not think we should have an incarnation-philosophy, properly speaking, if we held e.g. that minds must be embodied because "mind" is only a name for the mentality, the "minding" of certain high-grade animate bodies in a certain peculiar condition of waking vigilance. Again, we should not have an incarnation-theory if we held that a mind and a certain kind of animate body were inseparable companions, and if, generalizing, we refused to regard the separation of the companions as even a metaphysical possibility. For better measure, there are many other mind-body theories that are not general philosophical incarnation-theories, although we could say of all of them that the minds we know are *de facto* incarnated and that the thing cannot reasonably be supposed to be a sort of metaphysical accident.

At what point, then, would a mind-body theory come to be, or come near to being, an incarnation-philosophy? Plainly, I think, if, starting from mind as a *prius*, and attempting to unthink all embodiment, or to hold all embodiment in *epoche* or suspense, we found, or professed to find, that the nature of the *prius* resisted every such attempt and made the unthinking (or the indefinite *epoche*) forever impossible. If mind as *prius* craved embodiment with a metaphysical craving we should approach incarnationism in our philosophy. Similarly we should be near-incarnationists in our philosophy if we held, more guardedly, that the thing, although not perhaps strictly inevitable, was very likely indeed.

This finding, I suggest, accords with theology. In that science, incarnation theories start from the top, from God and not from the world, and try to show that, starting from the top, some sort of incarnation is either an inevitable implication of God's being or at any rate an appropriate course for God to take. If that be too strong a statement (on the ground, say, that *no* problem permits of only one line of approach) I should say that the most distinctive type of incarnation-theory always begins at the top, and that it is *such* incarnation-theories that I am about to discuss.

Beginning at the top, we may have to begin higher up than

mind, and need not rely on arguments that go to show that *minds* (to use Milton's term) must be "imbruted." For that reason I was careful to claim an analogy only between incarnation-theories and theories that try to show just *why* our minds have their bodies. A discussion in terms of finite minds and their finite bodies would rightly be held to be misleadingly narrow. True, it is very common to assume that God is a spirit, that spirit and mind are altogether or very nearly equivalent terms, and so that many essentials of the problem are constant. Other theologians would maintain, however, that deity is super-spiritual and super-mental and that the language in which we say that God is a spirit is only permissible in the sense that it is a less inadequate description of the Godhead than any other of a finite cast. Nevertheless, they say, we should not humanize, or mentalize, or spiritualize the deity when we are speaking strictly. By parity of reasoning we should not suppose that "incarnation" has any essential affinity with human flesh or with the divinity of the human shape. *The* Incarnation, supposing it to have occurred, was a theophany expressly designed *ad modum recipientis*, and for the vulgar rather than for philosophers. In philosophy the general problem of incarnation must really begin where it says it begins, namely at the top.

Arguing on these lines I suppose we might say that any theology that begins at the top either comes near to or actually reaches some sort of incarnation-theory. Take for instance the Ontological Argument, the Argument from the Priority of the Infinite to the Finite (which Malebranche, for example, did not effectually distinguish from the Ontological Argument) and some forms even of Creation-argument. The first of these argues from Perfection to its actualization, including all actual embodiment. The second attempts to generate all that is finite from the Infinite and so includes all that is made body or is made flesh. The third may be argued on various lines, most commonly from the supposed self-insufficiency of the world, the world's existence being regarded as a datum. If, however, the attempt were made to show arguing from above downward either that God *must* create a world, or at least that it would be very odd, very unlike him, if he didn't, the creation of

the world would be very hard to distinguish from its emanation, that is to say from a type of incarnation or materialization. If there are distinctions in these rarefied regions they are rather subtle.

We have therefore to regard "incarnation" as a general problem in philosophical or "natural" theology, the problem being whether it can be shown that God's nature is such that he must, or must reasonably be supposed to, "proceed" to some sort of embodiment of himself, that there would be something wrong with our notions of deity if no such conclusion were either necessary, or probable, or plausible.

In that sense the problem plainly pertains to general philosophy. For theism, to make the smallest claims for it, is one of the major metaphysical hypotheses, and, if it were no more than hypothesis, should receive what is due to all hypotheses, an examination of what follows from them. Moreover, since the hypothesis (if it be no more) is a hypothesis concerning the top, it is not merely legitimate, it is essential, to make an intellectual descent from the top. I do not say that this is all that theology should do. I say it is one of the things that theology has to do. Many theologians, it is true, may discern a more profitable policy if they begin, as they think, pretty low and work upwards; and in theory it ought to be possible to begin anywhere. The descent from the top, however, is always part of the problem wherever one may happen to start. As such, it requires (and so should receive) independent investigation. There is no single-track metaphysics to be ridden in vehicles that cannot reverse. Again, we have no right to say that we should always, in theory, begin with what is "better known to us." It is a question whether the top *is* the worst known to us, whether in the lower regions we do not mistake familiarity for knowledge; but even if there were no question about it, we should have to clarify our conceptions as best we could by arguing down as well as up, and by arguing down from as high up as we could go. No apologies are needed for such attempts in natural theology. It is the opponents who should ask for pardon.

What, then, are the most general arguments in this kind? I have noticed five, and no doubt have neglected many others.

but I shall try to deal briefly with the five I have noticed. They are all, I think, of pronounced philosophical importance.

The five arguments are:

(*a*) The argument from unity. Unity, it is said, demands multiplicity; and God is one.

(*b*) The argument from Being. Being demands characterization or differentiation. And God is Being Itself.

(*c*) The argument from Plenitude of Being. The fulness or perfection of being demands an overflow, part of which (or all of which?) is what we call the world. And God is fulness of Being.

(*d*) The argument from what is "beyond Being." God is said to be beyond "being" but to be very credibly or inevitably the source of "being."

(*e*) The argument from divine expression. God's incarnation is said to be his manifestation, his theophany. The argument is from the inevitableness of theophany.

I shall consider these arguments *seriatim*, trying to construe each of them rather liberally and bringing within their scope certain arguments that might appear to be independent but, in substance, do seem to pertain to some one of the five.

(*a*) The unity of the divine being is, of course (and tautologously), the cardinal tenet of all monotheism. Jewish and Mohammedan critics of Christianity, professing themselves to be unable to distinguish between Trinitarianism and tritheism, are witnesses to some of the difficulties that may be felt in certain forms of incarnation-theory. There would be an effective reply if the nature of unity were such as to demand or to generate multiplicity.

In a general way, unity is not opposed to multiplicity; for unity may be union or unitedness. Hence it should be inferred that unity and multiplicity, so far from being implacable enemies, are capable of forming the closest alliance. We often encounter wholes that are said, very justly, to be richer in proportion to the variety that they harmoniously include.

Unity, in short, is compatible with diversity, with variety; and it may welcome variety. The fact appears when, diversity

being given, we find that it is also unified. It is quite another thing, however, to claim in the abstract, and to try to show in the abstract, that unity demands or generates multiplicity of its own proper nature. The unity might be just a simple unit without (like a number) having its place in a series of units. Again it is illicit to argue that unity and variety as such are invincibly complementary. There is variety in a chaos, and "chaos" is a name for lack of unity.

In short, if we begin from below where variety is apparent, we may discover that the visible variety is conciliable with a very great unity. If, however, we begin at the top, and admit no extraneous evidence, it would not seem that we can be forced to admit multiplicity without surreptitiously including such extraneous evidence. That, however, is just what would have to be done if we tried to show that God without multiplicity would not be God, would not be truly One. The same would hold of *a priori* arguments to the effect that the descent from unity to multiplex union, although not absolutely compelled, is immensely probable, a *facilis descensus*. The most, I think, that can justly be claimed in this rarefied abstract way is that there is logical space for such a *descensus*, and so that, if there *were* extraneous information about multiplicity, the fact need not disturb monotheists.

For the most part, philosophers and theologians who attempt to start monistically from the very top speak as if the One could generate the many and embody itself or become flesh in that manner, or at least take the first metaphysical step towards such embodiment. One of the simplest statements ever made occurs in Indian philosophy. Brahman said "May I be many."[1]

Regarded as a temporal statement, such an expression would be quite unintelligible, contra-rational and not merely incomprehensible. So the "generation" must be presumed to be logical not temporal, an inevitable or probable implication, not a sequence in time. Even in that case the contention would presumably be that although unity and multiplicity are complementary, unity is the dominant complement. I can see no justification in the abstract for this insistence that the demo-

[1] Quoted by J. E. Carpenter, Theism in Mediaeval India, p. 198, cf. p. 323.

cratic element in the Real must be subordinated to a constitutional monarchy. *A priori* we have nothing but possible harmony without privilege or favoritism.

(*b*) The next argument is that Being (= God) is prior to its determinations but generates its determinations.

The first step in this argument was made very firmly in an old tradition, sometimes called *philosophia perennis*, and is still put in the forefront of metaphysics by many scholastic theologians. "What is it," M. Gilson asks, "which the mind is bound to conceive both as belonging to all things and as not belonging to any two things in the same way? Such is the riddle which every man is asked to read on the threshold of metaphysics. It is an easy one, as, after all, was that of the Sphinx; yet many a good man has failed to say the word, and the path to the metaphysical Sphinx is strewn with the corpses of philosophers. The word is — Being." [2] In another book,[3] M. Gilson quotes Augustine, "Non aliquo modo est, sed est, est," and he puts his trust in one of the more obvious interpretations of the enigmatical Exodus iii, 14, "And God said unto Moses, I am that I am. . . . Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, 'I am' hath sent me unto you." (Other writers recall the *tat tvan asi* of the East.)

Nearly everything in philosophy is disputable, but personally I should not be disposed to challenge the statement that every true assertion, directly or indirectly, is an assertion about something, therefore about some *thing*, therefore about some *being*. On the other hand, the inference that every assertion is about Being does not seem to be justified, and neither does its commonest variant "Being (or Reality as a whole) is the ultimate subject of all predication." Similarly I should decline to accept the argument that because every true assertion refers to some being, therefore every true assertion refers either to God or to some god.

Supposing, however, that such an inference could legitimately be made we should still have no right to assert that Being, pure Being, must be held in principle to generate all (or, for that matter any) of its specific determinations. When Being is so

[2] The Unity of Philosophical Experience, p. 312.

[3] L'Esprit de la philosophie médiévale, I, 57.

regarded it is regarded as the subject of predication, that is, as substance. Let us allow, for argument's sake, that the recurrent attacks on the conception of substance (one of which is so fashionable in our age) have proved abortive. In that case we should allow that substance cannot be reduced to "its" properties and that it is distinguishable from them. Nevertheless, an unpropertied substance, a Being that was *only* Being, would be what Hume said it was, an 'unintelligible chimera.' (I think that an unsubstantiated property is just as chimerical as an unpropertied substance, but the point does not concern the present narrative.)

In other words to say that something, that anything, must first *be* before it can be so and so, is to say what is false. If it *is*, it must be propertied and determinately so. Here the word "first" is subject to the same criticism whether it is intended to assert temporal priority or logical priority. "Being" does not first exist and then proceed in time to become such and such. Neither can it logically generate its own properties, the very properties that express what it *is*.

Therefore there is no *descensus* from Being as such to "being propertied." On the other hand if "being propertied," "being such and such," "being determinate" is regarded as synonymous with a very abstract type of "incarnation," we might say significantly that "being unpropertied" or "being (in that sense) *not* 'incarnated'" would be an impossibility, an *Unding*. I suspect, however, that this concession is not likely to seem very generous in theological circles. It would not permit us to say, for instance, that the *divine* being must be "incarnated," since a divine being would have the property of being divine, that is to say would be "incarnated" (in the sense of "propertied") already.

(*c*) The Principle of Plenitude, of metaphysical bounty, is not very fashionable in these days; but it need not be the worse for that. According to this principle, when we start from the top, we start with "perfection" in the sense of maximum fulness and therefore can show that any conceivable filling, including the "fulness" of being embodied, is metaphysically and theologically secure.

There is more than a whimsical change of the fashion in the current unpopularity of this argument. Its difficulties accumulated until they seemed to be quite visibly overwhelming.

One of the chief of them, it is true, may be rather too abstract to impress the many. It is that we should have to *prove* that there could be such an entity as maximum fulness of being. Some people seem to be quite happy about such a principle; but it does not need much penetration to see that a maximum (finite) number, say, is an absurdity. When the need for caution in these matters becomes plainly apparent the attempt to prove that there *is* maximum fulness of being instils a general dubiety.

More popular arguments, however, are easy to supply, and these may be "popular in the best sense," that is to say, they may be cogent, as well as convincing to the relatively uninitiated. Every fantastic piece of conceivable "being" might be said to be an inevitable constituent of maximum fulness. So why not populate the world with dragons and wyverns, and phlogiston and everything that Milton would have assigned to Limbo? There would be greater "plenitude of being" if there were dragons than if there weren't. If we say "But dragons are unreal; therefore their subtraction would make no difference to *real* plenitude of being," we have obviously to go clean outside the principle of plenitude in order to determine what sort of beings could or do not belong to the plenitude.

Let us take a more concrete illustration. In the evolution of animal species there have been many promising beginnings leading to a dead end, as dead as the dodo or the ichthyosaurus. According to the principle of plenitude all conceivable starts would have somewhere to be exemplified and all conceivable developments (say, of the mastodons) actually undergone. Does anyone believe such a thing? *Must* there somewhere be exemplifications of all the conceivable forms and shapes that the mastodons might have taken but didn't take? Must there somewhere, at some time, be all the possible fishes that never swam the waters, all conceivable bat-like creatures that weren't bats; and so on? That would be the sort of thing that must be meant if every conceivable degree and type of existence had to be filled. There could be no gaps, no mutations, no skipping of intermedi-

aries in the metaphysical plenum. Is *such* a principle secure? If it is not, we should have an attenuated sort of plenitude; and that would be a contradiction in terms.

That, I think, is enough to show how little we can expect to learn from an abstract principle of metaphysical plenitude regarding what does and what does not exist, regarding what happens *per saltum* and what does not, regarding the dead ends and the ends that look as if they should not have died.

Attempts have sometimes been made to be much more concrete, and to say that the principle of metaphysical bounty is a chilly way of stating what is said ardently and passionately when we speak of the Love of God. Thus Mr. A. E. Taylor, commenting upon a passage of the Timaeus (29 e), says, "Timaeus is thinking of the common Greek view that τὸ θεῖον is φθονερόν 'grudging' in its bestowal of good things. So just because God is good, He does not keep His blessedness selfishly to Himself. He seeks to make something else as much like Himself as goodness. It is of the very nature of goodness and love to 'overflow.' This is why there is a world, and why with all its defects it is 'very good.'" Mr. Taylor goes on to explain that the world cannot be as good as God Himself. If it were it would *be* God; and earlier upon the page [4] he says, "The goodness of God explains both why there is a world at all and why it is a good world. God is perfectly good; and φθόνος, the 'grudging' 'dog in the manger' disposition which seeks to engross all that is good for itself is bad and therefore foreign to God."

It is a question for Platonists whether that is what Plato meant. On that point Mr. Cornford and others have recently challenged Mr. Taylor. But whether or not the doctrine is Platonic, it is Philonic and Plotinian and is often expressed in the Jewish-Christian tradition. It purports to give a metaphysical basis for the origin of man and the world by emanation, creation or incarnation.

It seems to me to be difficult to believe that the argument, in any of its forms, is an ultimate piece of metaphysics. The 'dog in the manger' kept the horses out of the manger and grudged them what he could not use himself. That is, there was a dog

[4] A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus, p. 78.

as well as horses; so where is the analogy to a bounty or metaphysical largesse which is the origin, from God, of all that is not God? On the contrary, the argument presupposes that there *are* others to be thwarted or helped. Again, if perfection be taken to mean goodness, that is to say, an *optimum* condition instead of a condition of maximum fulness, the argument becomes unintelligible. How could the *optimum* be bettered by overflowing or being spilt into inferior types of being? A sort of romantic exuberance is suggested; not sober theology.

(*d*) The principle that God is beyond "being," ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, and that the incarnation is the birth of "being" itself, might seem (if it had any meaning) to be still more fundamental than any other incarnation-theory. It has, of course, been quite frequently held. In India theologians developed a doctrine of degrees of pre-existential vacuity. In China the Taoist school in particular developed such notions. "At the Great Beginning," we read, "there was Non-being. It had neither being nor name and was that from which came the One. When the One came into existence, there was the One but still no form. When things obtained that by which they came into existence, it was called their Power. What was formless, yet divided, though the division is not clearly made, was called Fate. This Fate, flowing into movement, brought things into existence." [5] In the West parallels abound. One thinks, for instance, of Eckhart's "unnatured nature" or of Thomas Traherne's saying, "He willed the creation not only that he might appear but be; wherein is seated the mystery of the eternal generation of His Son." [6]

I have to be brief in discussing such ideas because they seem to me to have deserted intelligibility altogether. To say that there is a Source of Being that itself is beyond Being is to say both that there *is* and that there *isn't* such a Source. It is to say what is senseless. The same holds, say of "dynamic vacuity." If it *is* dynamic it is *not* mere nothingness. Not to be, and to be nothing, are one and the same. In short, if we are to say significantly that God is "beyond being" or "beyond existence" we must be imputing a special character to "being" or

[5] Fung Yu-Ian, History of Chinese Philosophy, p. 224.

[6] Centuries of Meditations, p. 36.

"existence" and be asserting that this special character is derived from a source that "is" or "exists" in a still more general sense. Such a view entails no contradiction and avoids the paradoxical absurdity of "beyond being."

When the absurdity is removed, the metaphysical excitement subsides. What is now maintained is that formed things have their source in the formless (as in the Taoist excerpt), that physically determinate "nature" is derivative (and so, as with Eckhart, derived from an "unnatured nature"), that the universe is an emanation or a created thing: and the like. Such statements, if they are true, call attention to the need for an emanation-theory of formed things or of the physical universe, or for a creation-theory, or for an incarnation-theory. They do not supply the need. They put a question without answering it, without so much as trying to answer it. Since the Source must "be" or "exist" in the most general sense of "being" or "existing," these arguments are not distinct in principle from the others we have already examined. At the most they warn us to be cautious about the interpretation we put upon "oneness," "being," or "plenitude" when we argue downwards from them. What I have maintained in effect regarding "oneness," "being," or "plenitude" is that *no* downward argument is viable. "Being," for instance, is that which is propertied, not itself a propertied being that can generate other propertied beings. There is no occasion for separate discussion when οὐσία is given a special sense and when it is held that in that special sense there must be something ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας whence οὐσία is derived.

(*e*) In much of the literature, incarnation-theories are set forth, quite simply, as manifestation-theories. When they are not simply manifestation-theories they are in part manifestation-theories (as with Traherne). God's incarnation is just his theophany. In it the Unmanifest expresses Itself, becomes visible, and so is communicated. If we are idealists in our philosophy this aspect of the question swallows and digests all the rest. To be is to be manifest. All is phenomenalism of some kind, sensory phenomenalism, or rational phenomenalism, or spiritual phenomenalism.

Let me quote a few rather striking statements. (From the Epistle to Diognetus): "He sent for the Word that he might appear unto the world." (From Eriugena): "Every visible and invisible creature is a theophany." (From the Book of Enoch): "For before anything came into being I walked alone in the invisible realm. . . . And I commanded that in the highest region there should proceed from the invisible a visible thing" [i.e. Light]. (From the Hermetica): "Who is more manifest than God? For this very purpose he made all things that through all things you may see Him. This is God's goodness, this His clemency, that he manifests Himself in all things." (From a Sufi poet):

Although He beheld His attributes and qualities as a perfect whole in his own Essence
Yet he desired that they should be displayed to Him in another mirror. [7]

The last of these excerpts is more informative than the others. It expressly recognizes that God's manifestation of his own glory to Himself does not seem to require the furniture of earth and the pageantry of heaven. Without supplying any metaphysical or other explanation it asserts that God did desire "another mirror." That being understood, the poet's statement, allowing that it is poetry, seems to contain fewer surreptitious assumptions than is common in this matter. To be sure the metaphor of the "mirror," crassly understood, would imply the existence of extra-divine mirrors to reflect God's glory, but with a little goodwill we can read the meaning in terms of mirror-images without any mirror. With a little more goodwill we may avoid the difficulty that besets most theophanies viz. that they assume that the manifestation is to men or to some other non-divine beings, in which case either men are supposed to exist independently of deity (and the manifestation to be a consequence of a *very* "limited" degree of divine power) or, in the alternative, "incarnation" is held to be something quite different from creation, and supervenient upon creation, not another facet of the same process. If so the (occasional) Sufi doctrine of the world as the manifestation of the archetypal

[7] R. A. Nicholson's translation, The Mystics of Islam, p. 81.

Idea of Mohammed, or the doctrine of the "cosmic Christ" in Colossians I, 15 seqq., "the image of the invisible God, the first-born of every creature. He is before all things and by him all things consist," would be excluded.

The Sufi poet, therefore, perceived that God's choice of "another mirror" was in itself a mystery, not anything that could be said to be necessary, probable or plausible. It is not an implicate of God's self-expression to himself. In so far as "visibility" i.e. sensory manifestation is concerned, the covert assumption almost always is that because *men* form their ideas by their senses and communicate with one another by sensory signs that require a material vehicle, therefore God, in manifesting himself to *them*, must materialize himself in order to become visible. Such an argument, if taken as a piece of ultimate metaphysics, would seem to answer itself. The sort of man who asks to have everything proved upon his senses (like Didymus) is not the sort of being who is uniformly commended in theological circles. The sort of generation that is always looking for a sign has even been called evil and adulterous. Again it does not take a Berkeley to observe that if God desired to show himself in these ways to men, he need not materialize himself in order to do so. He might only arouse the appropriate sensations.

A further difficulty quickly emerges. According to many philosophers, sensuous revelation is always and necessarily *per speculum in aenigmate* because the senses are illusory. In that case a visible incarnation, being illusory, would be a sham, that is to say, *not* an incarnation. In the East this conclusion was explicitly drawn, "There is no dissolution, no creation: none is bound, none seeks deliverance, none is released. This is all Maya *with which God is Himself deluded.*" [8]

In the West, I suppose, we are most familiar with the following sort of reply: The senses, we are told, are not *mere* shams although they *are* appearances and to some extent fall short of reality. They are the *prima facie* Other of rational thought. This *prima facie* Other is not quite so "other" as it seems to be. On the contrary, rational thought, in the end, is always "at home with itself" in a domesticity of complete felicity. The

[8] Quoted by J. E. Carpenter, Theism in Mediaeval India, p. 305.

mistake of most of us is to accept *prima facie* "Otherness" as final.

Hence we might reach the usual Hegelian gloss upon incarnation-theories viz., the doctrine that God would not be God without (what we rashly accept as) the sense-world just as the sense-world would not be a world at all if it were completely detheomorphized. Such statements fit in well enough with several Christian theologies. Instead of saying in the Johannine way, "In the beginning was the Logos, and the Logos was God; and the Logos became flesh," we should say, "Rational thought eternally implies the Otherness that is revealed in sensation and incontinently supposed to be what it is not, invincibly independent otherness"; and we should probably go on to say that the Logos generates such Otherness in a logical and not in a temporal way. That is the intellectualistic solution. An alternative solution is the mystical super-intellectualistic. On this view the Logos is not God but is the "first-born among God's creatures" the πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως. God, in other words, is said to be the super-intellectual reality behind the Logos, and the source of the Logos, much as the Logos is said to be behind and to be the source of the sense-world. On either view we have an immanent idealism. All is thought or spirit. Thought (or spirit) does not refer to things. Things *are* thought (or spirit) and there is no transcendence of "thought" (or spirit) except in the limited way in which a limited thought-context may be said metaphorically to "refer" to the rest of a wider thought-context.

I think these theories should be resisted, but I do not have the space to pursue that topic here. I may have room, however, for a comment upon the intellectual way of explaining "incarnation," the way of rational phenomenalism. As it seems to me, we have *never* the right to say that sensual facts like color or shape or time-changes could ever be logicized without remainder. If that be so the Logos could not be the *sole* source of any sensory theophany, and we should worship it ignorantly if we thought so. It is not fleshly enough for the theory to be true.

With these remarks I shall end the examination of the five

theories I have selected for examination. The general conclusion, I submit, is that if we start from the top, and admit no extraneous data whatsoever, we are not compelled or even very strongly impelled to make any descent at all. If there is an exception it would seem to occur in the argument I have labelled (*b*). Being must be propertied; but that statement does not tell us anything about *what* properties it must possess, still less that these properties must be sensory, or bodily, or fleshly.

This negative result is not, of course, surprising. It marches with the opinion so common nowadays that *a priori* argument is sterile. For fecundity, it is said, there must be empirical data. That is as it may be. I have not relied upon any such dogma in anything I have said. But I should like to say now that, quite obviously, I have made no attempt to show that any empirical data we may have about the universe may not be conciliable with an incarnation-theory in some wide sense of that term.

In conclusion, however, I should like to say a little more about the general philosophical situation that confronts an incarnation-theory.

Enough, perhaps, has been said about the top. Much would be accomplished if it could be shown that there should be, or must be, a golden chain descending in a hierarchy that might resemble various levels of existence whose general character is relatively familiar. As I have said, I do not think we can show as much as that. But if we could show it, it would be ungenerous to complain if it proved to be impossible to specify each particular link in the golden chain, especially near the top. Therefore we need not enquire further into these upper links, whether the Logos comes first or second or later, how many great Eons there are or were, what is to be said of mediators like Marduk, Osiris, Attis, Adonis, Krishna, Amida or some cosmic Pharaoh, where precisely angels and archangels come in. It is so much easier to start than to stop speculation upon these lines.

On the other hand it seems advisable to consider the lowest links in the presumptive chain, or, if not the very lowest (supposing, for instance, that "matter" disintegrated under the attentions of the micro-physicists who are still very far from

the end), then something pretty low. After all, it is the necessary or probable or plausible *embodiment* of the *ens realissimum* that is usually discussed when incarnation is discussed, if, indeed it is not embodiment in the "flesh," taken literally. I shall therefore conclude this discussion with some remarks upon the *terminus ad quem* of an incarnation-philosophy, dealing firstly with spatialization and temporalization, and secondly with the flesh itself. Spatialization and temporalization, taken together (as in spatio-temporalization), give the essence of "materialization" (allowing for the subtleties of micro-physics), and the place of the flesh in cosmic theory (or, shall we say? of nerves and brain) is one of the problems that cannot reasonably be overlooked.

Consider spatialization. I should like to repeat what I have already said about the impossibility of showing that space is an inevitable and very lowly link in the golden chain. The Logos is the only putative parent for it whose paternity is at all plausible. Allow then that geometry shows that space is *very* logical, and even that it may be entirely amenable to logic. Its spread-out-ness, nevertheless, is a perceptual datum to which logic is applicable but which is logically ingenerable. That appears, *inter alia*, from the identity between space-structure and time-structure in a comparable dimension. The difference lies in the difference between before-and-after, on the one hand, and, say, right or left on the other hand. Such differences are perceptual, not affairs of pure logic. According to some philosophers, it is true, space is just *the* order of *co*-existence. In that case it would be reducible to time-and-logic although not to logic *simpliciter*. That view, however, cannot be sustained. Space may be *an* order of co-existence, but it is not the only conceivable order of co-existence. In a Leibnizian universe of unextended monads there would be an order of co-existence but no space; and Leibniz did not succeed in showing that this order must so much as *appear* to be spatial.

Consider, again, temporalization. Various attempts have been made to show that time is an "efflux" of eternity, its "moving image." The changeless, however, cannot generate the unchanging, the unmoving and immovable cannot begin to

move, the abiding cannot cease to abide and descend into the evanescent and the perishing. It is one thing to say that the flux of the real is not a mere flux but has aspects or ratios of immutable stability. That means that, given the flux, we should not deny every sort of stability. But if the flux were not "given" we could not generate it either logically or temporally from eternity. An efflux from the unfluxable is just an absurdity.

Regarding the "flesh," pretty narrowly interpreted, I suppose one might argue somewhat as follows: Man *de facto* is half god, half brute; but the god and the brute in him form a very subtle and a very intimate union. Therefore the human form is at least partially divinisable even if it be not "divine." What could a human mind be or do without a nervous system, without all the bodily nuances that intermingle in the most spiritual of human experiences? Generalizing from below upwards we may therefore conclude that the "flesh" is the only appropriate tabernacle or temple for a high-grade spirit. We may then reverse the argument and infer from below downwards.

So stated the argument seems to me to have no force at all. There are not the data for arguing from above downwards that there are for arguing from below upwards. Apart from that general difficulty, it is surely quite illegitimate to infer that because human flesh is a suitable temple for a high-grade spirit, therefore it, or something very like it, is the *only* suitable temple. If our spirits, after death, have "psychical" bodies, need these psychical bodies be *ghosts*, that is to say shapes that resemble and might be mistaken for men in the flesh? If, again, there were a cosmic Adam, or a cosmic Mohammed, or a cosmic Christ, some spirit whose body was the astronomical universe, could it be inferred that the astronomical universe has feet or hands or a nervous system? To argue so would be to confuse between the solar system and the solar plexus.

For reasons such as these, incarnationists are usually much less specific in their references to the "flesh." Often they say something like this: The universe cannot be wholly "mechanical" although there is mechanics in it. The pervasive co-adap-

tations in its pattern are of a super-mechanical order, and biology gives a better indication of that order than mechanics does. We may therefore infer that vital processes gather up and exemplify, with an unintended emphasis, a general inter-cosmic category. Mental and spiritual processes are still better exemplifications of the same category. Man the microcosm (as it were) collects and expresses the cosmic ethos, and does so quite humanly, that is, as a human body-mind. There is no accident in this. There is just metaphysics. Therefore the fact of "incarnation" is among the great realities. We can recognize the fact if we argue from below upwards, although we may be gravelled when we attempt to reverse the process without assuming empirical data. That, being an affair of method, need not disturb us very much.

I shall leave this suggestion without comment.

THE OCCASION OF LUKE III: 1–2

Various views have been held in the past concerning the purpose of the sixfold chronology in Luke. "The breaking of this oppressive silence [since the time of Malachi] by the voice of the Baptist caused a thrill through the whole Jewish population throughout the world. Lk. shows his appreciation of the magnitude of the crisis by the sixfold attempt to give it an exact date." [1] From this we may pass to a somewhat calmer later view. "The evangelist is using here a form which he has taken over from an alien sphere. . . . It is derived from secular historiography, which has the habit of making prominent important events, especially those with which the principal narrative begins, by means of circumstantial datings and synchronisms." [2]

This interest in chronology is late: it comes as Christianity becomes self-consciously an historical religion. The parallels cited by Klostermann [3] are instructive in this regard. Thucydides ii. 2 marks the beginning of the Peloponnesian wars — the main theme of his work. Polybius i. 3 is the beginning of the history of Rome. Josephus Antt. xviii. § 106, on a less exalted plane (and a much less extensive scale), gives the date of Herod's brother's death. A later passage I may cite is Eusebius, H. E. ii. 4. 1, which merely gives the period of Philo. But the purpose of none of these works is that of the third gospel. Whether we assume it to be with Acts an appeal to the Roman government for toleration [4] or a more general apologetic work, it is not primarily an historical writing.[5]

It seems to me that in addition to providing — presumably from a Jewish-Baptist source — a beginning for his narrative [6] the author may well have had a more specific purpose. There was considerable doubt, especially in the strong church of Asia, about the period of our Lord's earthly life. Its source was undoubtedly the tradition reflected in John viii. 57: εἶπαν οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι πρὸς αὐτόν· πεντήκοντα ἔτη οὔπω ἔχεις [7] and to Irenaeus [8] the confusing evidence [9] required a solution

[1] Plummer, St. Luke (1896), p. 80. [2] E. Schwartz in ZNTW, xi (1910), p. 102.

[3] E. Klostermann, Das Lukas-Evangelium (1929), p. 50.

[4] D. W. Riddle in Journal of Religion, x (1930), pp. 545–62.

[5] W. Manson, The Gospel of Luke (1930), p. xxiii.

[6] B. H. Streeter, The Four Gospels (1930), p. 209.

[7] There is little evidence that a similarly confusing passage, John ii. 20, had any influence; but cf. Augustine, De Doctr. Chr. ii. 28.

[8] Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. ii. 22; cf. Chapman in JTS, viii (1907), pp. 59–61.

[9] Luke iii. 23.

which he reached by postulating a longer ministry than was commonly accepted. The inevitable result is that in Epideixis, 74, he speaks of "Pontius Pilate, the governor of Claudius Caesar." [10] As von Dobschütz says, "When the Catholics with Irenaeus rejected the literal interpretation [of the acceptable year of the Lord], nothing prevented their adopting an allegorical explanation; and the more the idea of a secret tradition became popular among them, they were able to make use of the idea of a longer period of teaching. So nothing was easier than to interpret the twelve months as twelve years." [11] This view could also arise from a confusion of the tradition that the apostles remained in Jerusalem for twelve years after the resurrection: [12] to the early church the distinction was not sharp between the earthly and the risen Lord.

I thought at first that additional proof of this view's antiquity is given in Suetonius, Claudius, xxv. 3; I am grateful to Professor Nock for asking me to reconsider, and the general view "that there were troubles in the Jewish community at Rome, that people knew of them as being troubles, that they took an interest comparable with that ascribed to Gallio, and that they knew that the name Christ . . . came into the picture somewhere" is now mine, instead of the idea that Suetonius thought Jesus in Rome *sub Claudio*, an idea advanced by Henri Janne in Mélanges Bidez (1934), pp. 531–553.[13]

Justin Martyr [14] speaks of reliable Acts of Pilate; and Eusebius [15] describes ὑπομνήματα forged by pagans which were issued χθὲς καὶ πρώην — one need not build too much on πρώην, but it seems unlikely that

[10] The Epideixis is found only in an Armenian version, but its teaching is elsewhere so orthodox that I cannot suppose a substitution.

[11] Texte und Untersuchungen, xi. 1 (1893), pp. 148–49; Irenaeus himself preferred 20 years.

[12] Eusebius, H. E. v. 18. 14; Acta Petri c. Simone v.; Pistis Sophia, etc. The apostles alone are found in Kerygma Petri (in Clem. Alex., Strom. vi. 5. 43).

[13] He has corrected Preuschen's view (in ZNTW, xv (1914), p. 96) that this date came through Christians; but his own theory of a Jewish source seems equally difficult. His argument from the tenth century interpolation of Yosippon (cf. I. Lévi in Rev. des études juives, xci (1931), pp. 135–54) does not seem improved by the remark that "par endroits il s'appuie sur des traditions anciennes qu'il déforme d'ailleurs" (p. 547). The result is a singularly confused document which shows Jesus crucified in Tiberias in the presence of Caligus (= Caligula) and also visiting Claudius in Apion's place. I may add that Streeter once said that the only extra-biblical notices we have of early Christians were in his opinion from police reports.

[14] Justin, Apology i. 32, 38, 48.

[15] Eusebius, H. E. i. 9 (cf. i. 11 and ix. 5).

Eusebius himself thought such memoirs new: he himself uses Christian Acta in H. E. ii. 2. The pagan Acta date the passion in the seventh year of Tiberius, or A.D. 21;[16] the fourth or fifth century letter[17] of Pilate to the emperor, on the other hand, begins Πόντιος Πιλάτος Κλαυδίῳ Χαίρειν.

In addition one may mention the view of later writers who give this chronological scheme: A.D. 9 — birth, A.D. 46 — baptism, and A.D. 58 — passion. Two versions[18] of a ninth century fragment state that such a chronology was *scripta . . . in membranis Alexandri episcopi qui fuit in ierusalem. Quod transcripsit manu propria de exemplaribus apostolorum* — by which he means Hippolytus. Dom Chapman has shown that the original reading of Hippolytus on Daniel iv. 23 places the birth of Jesus in the fortieth year of Augustus (= A.D. 9) and his passion in A.D. 41 (this follows a Western chronology based on Tertullian Adv. Iudaeos).[19] Annianus, however, follows the revised version of Hippolytus which gives A.D. 11. Syncellus, following the "blessed apostle and archbishop [!] of Rome Hippolytus . . . and the most holy monk Annianus,"[20] gives us A.D. 12; and the passion is ἐν ὑπατεία Νέρωνος τὸ τρίτον (= A.D. 58).[21] Epiphanius[22] arguing against the Alogi says that our Lord was born in the 42nd year of Augustus, although he gives the consuls (presumably from the "Western" list) for the 40th year. Since his 51st chapter is based on Hippolytus he may well have tried to fuse both earlier and later versions.

One may agree with Dom Chapman that all[23] these late errors depend on the confusion — worse confounded — of Tertullian; but the wandering of the chronology does not begin then; it begins, in my opinion, as early as the first draft of the materials for the fourth gospel,

[16] More probably, as Lipsius, Die Pilatus-Acten (1886), p. 31, pointed out, the "seventh year" is Eusebius' own error; the author Theotecnus intended A.D. 31 but relied on the Fasti Idatiani which wrongly place the fourth consulship of Tiberius there.

[17] Descensus ad inferos, xiii (in Tischendorf, Ev. Apocr., p. 413); Acta Petri et Pauli (in Tisch., Acta Apost. Apocr., p. 16).

[18] Collated by Chapman in JTS, vii (1907), p. 591.

[19] Ibid., p. 598.

[20] Syncellus, Chronogr. (ed. Dindorf), p. 597. He argues against Panodorus, who gives 5493 (= 7 B.C.), p. 592.

[21] Ibid., p. 607; he also gives Tiberius XIX, as Chapman notes. Here the Nero date may reflect the 46 years of John ii. 20; or it may be mere error.

[22] Epiphanius, Adv. Haer. li. 29.

[23] Perhaps only the consular list; and additional confusion came from the two ways of reckoning the years of Augustus: from 44 and from 31.

which I think may be placed well within the first century. The chronology of Luke iii. 1–2 is an attempt, finally successful, to check this aberration.[24]

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[24] Another attempt at control was made by Phlegon (in Origen, Contra Celsum ii. 33), who tried to date the passion by an earthquake in Bithynia in 32–33. The success of the Lucan date is no guarantee of its accuracy; the thirty years of iii. 23 are deduced from iii. 1 and ii. 2 (perhaps in opposition to John viii. 57), but Irenaeus quotes Papias to the effect that our Lord was at least forty (Adv. Haer. ii. 22); and any commentary will show the errors of the synchronism. Cf. Goguel in Rev. de l'hist. des rel. lxxiv (1916), pp. 9–11.